Financial contagion : Robustness of financial network structures by Kaspersen, Are
Financial contagion:
Robustness of financial network
structures
by
ARE KASPERSEN
THESIS
for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
(Master i Anvendt matematikk og mekanikk)
Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences
University of Oslo
May 2011

iii
Abstract
In [2] Allen and Gale showed how an interbank market can be affected by re-
gional liquidity shocks, and how a local bank crisis can become global when
banks are interconnected through deposits. The purpose of this thesis is
to analyze the robustness of different interbank market structures towards
regional liquidity shocks. We formulate a mathematical framework for the
analysis and show how to find optimal deposits between banks by solving a
minimum flow distribution problem on a network with the underlying graph
representing the market structure. We use a breadth-first search (BFS) algo-
rithm, which takes the optimal deposits between banks as input parameter,
to traverse through the graph and analyze the effects of a regional liquidity
shock.
Central results include showing that a maximum correlation linear graph is
the least robust market structure, and we derive an optimality result for the
k-regular bipartite graph. Robustness properties of other graph structures
are also found. The results are shown by deriving properties of the mini-
mum flow distribution problem, which are used for the analysis of the BFS
algorithm.
The thesis also include numerical simulations, which confirm and illustrate
the theoretical results, and MATLAB program code written specifically to
solve the Allen and Gale model for different underlying graph structures.
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Chapter1
Introduction
The financial crisis, which struck the world economy in the fall of 2008, was a
prime example of how fragile and interconnected financial markets are. What
started as a housing crisis in the United States, led to a global breakdown
that affected not only Wall Street, but financial institutions, governments
and people all over the world.
The scale of damage driven by the crisis was enormous. In 2007 real GDP
growth in the industrialized world was 2.8%. In 2009 it had fallen to −3.2%.
Public debt levels have increased tremendously and gross government debt
in G-20 countries is expected to rise from 78% in 2007 to 118% in 2014 [23].
In the European Union, the number of unemployed increased by 5.4 million
from March 2008 to May 2009 [11]. In its latest Global Financial Stability
Report, IMF estimates the cost of the crisis in terms of bank losses to be
$2.2 trillion [12]. For comparison, this is nearly 5 times the value of the
Norwegian Pension Fund Global as of 2010 (est $0.5 trillion) [18].
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The World Bank chief, Robert Zoellick, said about the recent financial crisis
that ”This has been a man-made catastrophe [...] We need concerted action
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now to build a better system for the future.1” In the crisis aftermath there
has been great political will to regulate the roles of financial intermediaries
and reform the way financial markets operate. Going from political will to
implementing actual measures to ensure financial stability must be founded
on an understanding of financial markets and financial crises.
Although the severity and far-reaching impact of the recent crisis brought
hightened public awareness to the matter, financial crises are well-known
features of the financial market. A number of crises have been identified and
analyzed throughout history. Sprague surveys crises in the United States
during the era of National Banking as early as 1910 [24]. Much has been
written on the Great Depression, arguably the largest recession in modern
times, e.g. [16] or [5]. After the World War II there was a 25 year period
without major crises [4], while the World Bank lists more than 80 crises
from 1975 to 1996 [6]. Financial crises have also been analyzed in various
theoretical frameworks. In the literature on financial crises, there are two
key issues at hand: What happens before and during a crisis, and do such
events result from inherent qualities in the financial market. The answers
to these questions can potentially have a huge impact on policy making and
regulations.
Arguably, the most influential model of banking panics and financial crises
is the Diamond-Dybvig model [10]. The model uses banks’ investments in
illiquid assets and the fact that depositors are allowed to withdraw from
a bank at any time to develop a theory of bank runs as an equilibrium
phenomenon. The model advocates the view of banks as inherently unstable
institutions.
The last decade has seen an enormous growth in the literature on social and
economic networks. The growth has been driven partly by increased aware-
ness of the role that networks play in such settings, partly by the enormous
amount of data produced from the Internet, and partly from the improved
computational possibilities from faster computers and better algorithms. The
two latter enable us to reconstruct and analyze much larger real-world net-
works than ever before. Developing this field of study, the study of complex
social and economic networks, has been a joint effort from a multitude of dis-
ciplines with important contributions from computer scientists, mathemati-
cians and statisticians, and economists and sociologists. For an overview of
the economics of networks, see [15] or [25]. For an introduction to many of
the algorithmic and mathematical aspects of network economics, [20] presents
up-to-date research topics in the related field of algorithmic game theory.
1http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3187467/
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The theory of financial crises has not escaped the attention of network
economists. An important contribution to the literature was made by Allen
and Gale in 2000 [2]. Their ”Financial Contagion” is one of the first papers
to discuss the role the network structure can play in transmitting a crisis.
Building on the Diamond-Dybvig model, they analyze an interbank market
connected by deposits held by banks in other banks. The paper’s most im-
portant conclusions are that the connectedness of the market can lead to the
spread of a financial crisis to other regions through spillover effects between
the regions, and that the structure of interconnections critically affects the
potential spread of a crisis.
The theoretical literature on contagion takes two approaches. Following the
paper from Allen and Gale, many models have explained various network
effects created from individual bank risk. The source to contagion in all this
work is the direct linkages between banks, like the interbank deposits in [2].
A different approach is one where the focus is indirect linkages in the form of
dependencies between banks’ portfolios. For an extensive survey of literature
on financial contagion, see [1].
The literature on contagion seems to agree that dense networks with a high
number of connections and short diameters are more robust than less dense
networks. When it comes to the effect of different network topologies beyond
this high connectivity property, the literature is very limited. This thesis
addresses this void, and tries to provide some understanding on how the
network structure affects the robustness of financial markets. We use Allen
and Gale’s model as a starting point to explore a broader range of network
structures and their properties in equilibrium.
In Chapter 2, the reader is introduced to the basics of game theory, graph
theory and financial intermediation. The purpose is to provide a theoretical
context for the thesis and to introduce concepts that will be used in later
chapters.
Chapter 3 is an extensive presentation of Allen and Gale’s model of financial
contagion and a summary of the most important results they present in [2].
The economic intuition behind the model as well as more technical aspects
are explained in this chapter.
The analyses in the original article are restricted to two symmetric graphs. In
Chapter 4, we introduce a mathematical generalization of the problem that
will enable us to analyze a broader range of graph families. In particular we
see how the problem of redistributing liquidity in an interbank market can
be formulated as a minimum network flow problem and how the spread of a
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
crisis can be analyzed with a breadth first search algorithm.
Chapter 5 contains the main theoretical results developed in this thesis. It is
shown that the linear graph with maximum correlation between nodes is the
least robust graph. An optimality property of a k-regular bipartite graph
in terms of robustness is derived. Robustness properties of certain other
graph structures are also presented. All analyses are undertaken within the
framework from Chapter 4.
In Chapter 6, we provide numerical examples and simulations both to confirm
our theoretical results and illustrate the dynamics of the model.
Finally we conclude in Chapter 7 by summing up the insights from this thesis
and pointing out possible directions for further research within the field.
Chapter2
Theoretical background
This chapter will introduce basic theory in topics relevant for the thesis such
as game theory, graph theory and financial intermediation. The purpose is
to provide a context within which the thesis is studied and develop notation
and results that are used in later chapters.
2.1 Game theory
Game theory can be described as the study of strategic interaction. More
precisely, it is a branch of mathematics studying situations with multiple
players, where all players choose between a set of strategies, and each player’s
payoff to choosing a strategy depends on the strategies chosen by the other
players. Definitions and results are from [26], which gives a much more
extensive introduction to basic game theory. Computational aspects of game
theory, which is of great general interest, but of limited relevance for this
thesis, are dealt with in the article collection [20].
There are two equivalent standard representations of games. We first define
the normal form game.
Definition 2.1. A normal form game Γ consists of a set of n players,
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Each player i has a set of possible strategies, Si. The set
of all possible combinations of strategies is S where S is the Cartesian prod-
uct S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn. Player i chooses a strategy si ∈ Si. The vector
s = (s1, . . . , sn) of all the players’ strategies is called a strategy profile. Player
i’s preferences over outcomes is represented by a utility function ui : S → R.
5
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The vector of strategies played by all players except player i is for shorthand
written s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
A game can also be represented as an extensive form game.
Definition 2.2. An extensive form game Γ consists of the following data:
1. A finite set {1, 2, . . . , n} of players.
2. A rooted tree T called a game tree with a payoff for each of the n
players associated to each leaf node.
3. A partition of non-leaf nodes in n+1 subsets, one for each player, and a
subset for ”Nature” with a probability distribution over outgoing edges.
4. Nodes of Nature have a probability distribution over outgoing edges.
5. A partitioning of a player’s set of nodes in information sets (defined
below).
For complete information games, the subset of Nature is empty. The descrip-
tion of the game is common knowledge among the players.
3 
3 
2 
5 
1 
1 
5 
2 
C 
A 
C A 
(a) Normal form game
C A 
C A C A 
2 2 
1 
(3,3) (2,5) (5,2) (1,1) 
(b) Extensive form game
Figure 2.1: Prisoners dilemma - different representations
A strategy for a player in an extensive form game, is a complete specification
of which action to take at every node belonging to the player.
In extensive form games, the notion of information sets plays an important
role.
Definition 2.3. An information set in an extensive form game Γ is a collec-
tion of decision nodes such that
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1. The same player is assigned the move at every node in the set.
2. The player has the same available action choices at every node.
3. The moves played to reach a node in the information set is the same
for all nodes in the set.
Central in the study of game theory is equilibrium analysis. Informally, an
equilibrium is a situation where all players have adopted strategies that they
are unlikely to change. There are many different equilibrium concepts which
try to capture this idea. Important for this thesis and arguably the most well-
known is the Nash Equilibrium. A strategy profile s is a Nash Equilibrium
if the following holds for all players: A player cannot increase his own payoff
by changing strategy, given that the other players stick to their strategies.
More formally, we define pure strategy and mixed strategy equilibriua.
Definition 2.4. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies if for all players i and all strategies si ∈ Si the following holds:
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i).
To define the notion of a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium we need to first
define a mixed strategy
Definition 2.5. A mixed strategy xi for player i is a probability distri-
bution over the set of player i’s possible strategies Si. Let Xi be the set
of mixed strategies for player i. Define by x a mixed strategy profile x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and the set of all mixed strategy profiles X = X1×X2× . . .×
Xn. Furthermore, define
x(s) = Πnj=1xj(sj),
as the probability of combination s under the mixed strategy profile x. The
expected payoff to player i under a mixed strategy profile x is
Ui(x) =
∑
s∈S
x(s)ui(s).
Definition 2.6. For a game Γ, a strategy profile x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) in X is
a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium if for every player i and for every mixed
strategy yi ∈ X we have
Ui(x−i, xi) ≥ Ui(x−i, yi).
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One of the most important game theoretical results is the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in any game with a finite set of players and finite set of strategies.
Theorem 2.1. If Γ is a game with a finite set of players and a finite set of
strategies, there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Proof. See [19] for Nash’s original proof.
A game can have multiple Nash equilibria. A simple illustration is a co-
ordination game with two players. The players each possess one unit of a
good and can choose to invest it (I) or not invest it (NI). The investment
yields positive net returns if both players invest. If only one player chooses
to invest, the investment does not pay off. In this case there are two pure
strategy equilibria, a) both players invest, and b) no player invests. We see in
2 
2 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
I 
NI 
I NI 
Figure 2.2: Example of coordination game (NE with red circle)
figure 2.2 that the equilibrium where both players invest would yield higher
payoffs for both players than the equilibrium where no player invests. When
an equilibrium gives higher payoff than another equilibrium for all players,
we say that the higher payoff equilibrium pareto dominates the other.
Definition 2.7. If s∗ and s′ are two strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria
in a game Γ, we say that s∗ pareto dominates s′ if, for all players i, the
following is satisfied
ui(s
∗) ≥ ui(s′),
and we have strict inequality for at least one i.
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The definition of Nash equilibrium is broad in the sense that games often
have multiple Nash equilibria and we can, in certain cases, have equilibria
that require behavior that seems irrational or unrealistic from rational utility-
maximizing agents. There are many refinements of the equilibrium concept
reducing the set of equilibria. An important and widely used refinement,
which will be used in this thesis, is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Definition 2.8. Let Γ be a game on extensive form. A subgame is any part
of the game that satisfies the following criteria:
1. The initial node is in a singleton information set.
2. It contains every successor node to this node.
3. If it contains any part of an information set, then it contains all nodes
in the information set.
Definition 2.9. A strategy profile s is a subgame perfect equilibrium if, for
every subgame of the original game Γ, it is a Nash Equilibrium.
The set of subgame perfect equilibria is a subset of Nash Equilibria.
Subgame perfect equilibrium filters out Nash equilibria that could arise from
non-credible threats, since it requires the strategies to be consistent in all
parts of the game. This could be understood by the ultimatum game, a
sequential game where two players divide a sum of money. Figure 2.3 is an
example of an ultimatum game on extensive form. The first player proposes
how to divide (e.g. either fair (F) or unfair (UF)), and the second player
can either accept (A) or reject (R) the offer. If he rejects, both players get
nothing, if he accepts, the money is divided according to the first player’s
proposal. There are two Nash equilibria in this game: One where the second
player rejects all offers if the first player get anything at all, and then both
players get nothing. The second one is where the second player accepts an
offer above a certain threshold and the first player offers the threshold value
to the second player. The first Nash equilibrium does not satisfy the stronger
subgame perfect equilibrium, since the threat from the second player of re-
jecting any offer is irrational for a utility maximizing agent, who will always
choose the strategy that gives the highest payoff. The threat of rejecting an
offer which would yield a positive net payoff is therefore not credible. The
second Nash equilibrium is the game’s only subgame perfect equilibrium. In
figure 2.3 the first Nash equilibrium corresponds to the lower right node and
the second subgame perfect equilibrium is the lower left node of the decision
tree.
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F UF 
A R A R 
2 2 
1 
(5,5) (0,0) (8,2) (0,0) 
Figure 2.3: Example of ultimatum game on extensive form
2.2 Economics of information
The overview in this section is based on [17], which provides a detailed pre-
sentation of the theory of incentives under asymmetric information.
We consider a situation where there are two types of players; principals and
agents. A principal is a person who authorizes another person, an agent,
to act on his behalf. The principal will seek to maximize the utility from
hiring an agent, that is the optimal solution to a principal-agent problem is
utility maximizing for the principal. In many strategic situations information
has economic value and economic agents might not have access to the same
information. This information asymmetry needs to be taken into account
when such situations are analyzed and this may affect the optimal solution
as opposed to an optimum under full information.
A situation where information asymmetry might cause problems is the prin-
cipal agent problem. When a principal hires an agent to pursue his interests,
it is possible that the agent has conflicting interests. This might result in
behavior that is suboptimal, at least from the principal’s point of view. A
problem that often arises is that of adverse selection, which occurs when
agents can be of different types, but the principal cannot control for an
agent’s type. Asymmetric information might lead to a ”bad” selection of
agents accepting the contract.
In this thesis we will consider a variant of the principal-agent problem, where
banks (principals) offer a contract to consumers (agents) that they either
11 CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
accept or reject. Accepting means that consumers place deposits in a bank,
such that the bank can invest the deposits in short term and long term assets.
The consumers can choose to liquidate their deposit either earlier or later,
depending on their preferences. A central planner seeks to find the contract
that maximizes consumer utility under certain feasibility constraints. The
feasibility constraints are simply inherent limitations of the problem. For
example the investment problem, where a feasibility constraint is that you
cannot invest more than you have. The first-best allocation is the solution to
the utility maximization problem under the feasibility constraints.
Under information asymmetry, implementation of the first-best allocation is
not always possible. When there are different types of economic agents and
an agent’s type cannot be verified, we can have situations where an agent
does not have proper incentives to reveal his own type, but will benefit from
mimicking a different type of agent. Conditions to ensure that economic
agents reveal their true type are called incentive compatibility constraints.
An incentive-efficient allocation is the optimal allocation when the incentive
compatibility constraints are added to the problem. The first-best allocation
is not necessarily incentive-efficient, since we, by introducing new constraints
to the problem, optimize over a subset of the original domain. If the incentive
compatibility constraints are binding, the optimal solution will shift and the
information asymmetry will have imposed a cost compared to the first-best
that could have been achieved under full information. In this thesis, as we
will see in a later chapter, the first-best allocation is also incentive-efficient,
so the first-best can be implemented.
2.3 Financial markets
The main interest in this thesis is to analyze a model for financial contagion
in an interbank market with respect to the network structure of the market.
This section explains aspects of financial markets of interest for the thesis,
in particular the role of financial intermediaries like banks, and the theory
behind occurrence of financial crises. For an extensive survey of the literature
on financial intermediaries and crises, see [14].
2.3.1 Financial intermediation
Financial intermediaries are institutions that borrow from one group (con-
sumers/savers) and lend to another group (companies/investors) that needs
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resources for investment. In other words, they connect surplus agents with
deficit agents and enable the channeling of funds between them.
An important feature of financial intermediaries is that they facilitate the
use of consumer liquidity surplus to finance long-term investments. When
consumers choose to lend surplus funds to a financial intermediary, the inter-
mediary gets access to liquidity that it can lend to those who need liquidity
for some sort of investment. There is a long term perspective to a large share
of the investments, to which financial intermediaries provide liquidity. Com-
panies typically borrow to invest in equipment, buildings or infrastructure,
which do not yield returns in the short run. Individuals borrow to invest in
real property. In none of the cases can the financial intermediary expect to
liquidate the loan prematurely, which is normally reflected in the contract
between the financial intermediary and the borrower. This use of short-term
consumer surplus of liquidity to finance long-term investments has a very
important implication; if too many lenders simultaneously choose to liqui-
date their claims to the financial intermediary, it will be impossible for the
intermediary to meet the demand. The system will, in other words, work
as long as the financial intermediary is able to predict consumers’ behavior
within some margin of error when choosing where to channel its liquidity.
Following the discussion above, we see the importance of consumer trust in
the financial intermediary. As long as lenders believe that banks are able
to meet demand for liquidity at any time, we can expect the lenders to act
predictable and rational on average. On the other hand, if depositors for
some reason believe that the financial intermediary might be running out of
liquid means, and that their holdings in the intermediary are at risk, they are
more likely to withdraw. If enough depositors withdraw, the intermediary
will run short on liquidity, which again can result in even more depositors
withdrawing. This effect is known as a bank run. In a bank run, the high
number of depositors withdrawing, because they believe a bank is insolvent,
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy; their withdrawal increases the likelihood of
a default, which in turn encourages more depositors to withdraw. The result
for the bank can be bankruptcy. In this thesis, the starting point for the
analysis is a similar situation where a liquidity shock results in bankruptcy.
An explanation for the liquidity shock could be a loss of trust in banks. The
underlying reasons for a liquidity shock is, however, beyond the scope of this
thesis, in which we will consider the network effects given the initial shock.
There are several explanations as to why financial intermediaries exist. Di-
amond [9] explained financial intermediaries as monitors of borrowers. A
lender must monitor a borrower, since there is an ex post information asym-
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metry in the output of a borrower’s investments: Only the borrower knows
the real output. From a lender’s viewpoint, monitoring borrowers is costly,
and it is efficient to delegate the task to a specialized agent, the financial
intermediary such as a bank.
Another explanation is that bank-like financial intermediaries can produce
costly but valuable information. The basis for the theory is the existence
of costly information about investment opportunities, such that economic
agents may want to produce this information. This contains, however, a
”reliability problem” to it, as it may be difficult for the economic agent to
prove the value of the information he has produced. A related problem is
that buyers of information can share the information with others without
necessarily reducing the value the information has to them. It may be diffi-
cult for the information producer to fully capture the returns to producing
the information. This is called the ”appropriability problem”. Both these
problems can motivate the existence of an intermediary.
The explanation that is most relevant for this thesis is that banks act as
consumption smoothers, an idea first formalized in the Diamond and Dybvig
model [10]. Consumers invest liquidity surplus in banks. The model assumes
that consumers have uncertain preferences for future consumption. This un-
certainty may lead to consumers having to liquidate investments prematurely
in order to finance early consumption. If consumers save via intermediation
they might be able to diversify the consumption shocks. This also provides
a view of banking from the liability side, where consumers have the right
to withdraw from the bank to satisfy consumption needs. A third element
incorporated in the model is that consumers have private information about
the realization of their consumption preferences. An important feature of
the Diamond and Dybvig model is the fact that it has multiple equilibrium
solutions, one of which is a bank run.
2.3.2 Financial crisis
When we talk about financial crises, bank runs, contagion and related terms,
we need to have a clear understanding of what we are talking about. It turns
out to be difficult to give precise definitions; the broad literature on the topic
does not provide uniform answers. Rather than trying to give generally valid
definitions, we will define the terms in the context of this thesis and the
model we are working with.
A bank run is when a large number of depositors all of a sudden choose to
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liquidate their deposits in a bank because they believe the bank is or might
become insolvent. This could happen in one bank in one region or in many
banks in many regions. In this thesis, since banks in a region are assumed to
be identical, bank runs will be regional. A bank run may lead to insolvency
and bankruptcy.
A financial crisis is usually characterized by one of the three following events:
1. High proportion of banks fails.
2. Large/important banks fail.
3. Government intervention needed to prevent 1 or 2.
In this thesis, where we assume numerous identical banks in a region, a
regional financial crisis is when a bank run causes bankruptcies in banks in
a region.
Contagion is the transmission of a financial shock from one region to other
regions. Contagion can occur if banks in a region go bankrupt because of a
liquidity shock, and banks in other regions become insolvent and go bankrupt
as a result because of financial interdependencies between regions. In the
model, when the crisis spread, the spillover effect grows bigger for every
new bankrupt region, and will, if it starts spreading, in most cases reach all
regions of the world: A regional crisis thus causes a global crisis where all
regions are bankrupt.
A central question is whether financial intermediaries are inherently unstable.
There are a lot of different theories to support either view. The Diamond
and Dybvig model explains the occurrence of financial crises by ”sunspot”
phenomena, that is external and unpredictable events that make depositors
withdraw from the bank. This creates distrust in the bank’s ability to provide
liquidity among depositors, and the depositors beliefs become self-fulfilling,
with a bank run and potentially a financial crisis as the outcome. The model
has multiple equilibria, and a sunspot event can move the system from an
equilibrium where banks are solvent to one of a bank run [10].
Allen and Gale build on the Diamond and Dybvig model and extend it to
a network setting. Banks are interconnected through a network of deposits,
and Allen and Gale show that sunspot events in one region can affect other
regions, even if the beliefs in those regions stay unchanged. The next chapter
gives an extensive presentation of Allen and Gale’s model and results.
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2.4 Graph Theory
The thesis discusses how the market structure in an interbank market of
deposits affects the robustness of the market when exposed to liquidity shocks
in a subset of regions. The market is modeled as a graph, and this section
will introduce the reader to basic graph theoretic notions that will be used
throughout the thesis. This includes the definition, representation, and basic
properties of graphs. We will also introduce certain graph families that will
be discussed in this thesis.
2.4.1 Basic graph theory
Notation and definitions in this section follow J.A. Bondy and U.S.R. Murty
in [3].
A graph is a graphical representation of a set of elements called vertices,
and their interconnections, called edges. Edges can be used to illustrate the
relation between elements. Vertices are also referred to as nodes. Links and
connections are sometimes used to describe edges.
Formally, a graph G is an ordered pair of two disjoint sets, (V (G), E(G)). A
set V (G) of vertices and a set E(G) of edges. When there is no ambiguity we
normally write V := V (G) and E := E(G). Each edge e in G is associated
with an unordered pair of vertices u and v in G by an incidence function
φG, such that φG(e) = {u, v}. The edge e is then said to be incident with
u and v, and we write e = uv. If an edge is incident with only one vertex,
it is called a loop. In this thesis, we consider only simple graphs, meaning
graphs with no loops. Two vertices incident with the same edge are said to
be adjacent. The number of vertices in a graph G is denoted n = |V (G)|,
and the number of edges is m = |E(G)|. We are often interested in the set of
edges that connects nodes in a subset U ⊂ V of the nodes with nodes outside
the subset. This set is called the boundary of U and is denoted ∂(U). The
number of edges with one end in the subset is |∂(U)|.
Graphs have a visual representation, but for many purposes it is useful to
introduce matrix notation. We consider two different matrices associated
with a graph; the incidence matrix and the adjacency matrix. If G = (V,E)
is a graph, the incidence matrix of G is the n × m matrix MG := (mve)
where mve is the number of times that vertex v and edge e are incident. If
the graph has no loops, all entries in the incidence matrix are either 0 or 1.
The adjacency matrix of G is the n × n matrix AG := (auv), where auv = 1
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Figure 2.4: Graph with six vertices and six edges
if there is an edge e ∈ E(G) that connects u and v, and auv = 0 if there is
no such edge. Most graphs have more edges than vertices, so the adjacency
matrix normally gives the most compact representation.
A graph is undirected if the edges have no orientation, that is e = uv = vu.
The set of adjacent vertices to a vertex v is called the neighbors of v, and
is denoted NG(v). The number of neighbors to a vertex u is the degree of
the vertex, denoted dG(u). maxv∈V dG(v) is called the maximal degree, and(∑
v∈V dG(v)
)
/n is the average degree of G.
Certain families of graphs are of particular importance. A graph is complete
if any two vertices are adjacent. If the edge set is empty, the graph is empty.
A path is an alternating sequence of incident vertices and edges where all
edges are distinct. A cycle is a path with the the same start and end vertex.
If the vertex set can be divided in two disjoint subsets X and Y such that
every edge has one end in X and one end in Y , the graph is bipartite. If the
nodeset consists of two disjoint sets X, Y , such that X ∪ Y = V , and we
can find an edge subset E ′ ⊂ E such that each node in X is uniquely linked
to a node in Y , we say that the graph M = (X, Y,E ′) is a perfect bipartite
matching.
A subgraph of G = (V,E) is a graph with node set V ′ ⊆ V and where the
edge set is the restriction of E to V ′. A connected component in a graph G
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is a subgraph of G such that there is a path between any two nodes in the
subgraph, and the subgraph is connected to no other nodes in G. If G has
only one connected component, G is connected. A node v in G is said to be a
cut node if removal of v and all its incident edges from G gives a graph with
more connected components than the original graph.
An important graph family is trees. A tree can be defined by the following
property
Definition 2.10. A connected graph T = (V,E) is a tree if and only if
|E| = |V | − 1.
Each node in a tree has an associated set of nodes called children and an
associated single node called parent. A root in a tree is a node with no parent
node. Nodes with no children are called leaf nodes. A subtree of T consists
of a node and all its descendants in the tree.
2.4.2 Directed graphs and network flow
In many applications it is useful to allow the connections between nodes to
have an orientation. A directed graph D, abbreviated digraph, is an ordered
pair (V (D), A(D)) where V is the set of nodes and A a set of arcs and an
incidence function φD mapping each arc to an ordered pair of nodes in in
V . If a is an arc and φ(a) = (u, v) we say that u dominates v. The node
u is the tail of a and the node v is the head. We define the negative of a
as the arc between the same nodes but opposite orientation; if a = uv then
−a = vu. If the orientation of an arc is irrelevant for a discussion, it can
be referred to as an edge in the digraph. Many definitions and results from
the theory of undirected graphs are easily extended to directed graphs. The
set of nodes that dominate v is the set of in-neighbors of v, and is denoted
N−D (v). The set of nodes dominated by v is the set of out-neighbors of v and
is denoted N+D (v). Similarly, the cardinality of N
−
D (v) is the indegree of v
denoted d−D(v), and the cardinality of N
+
D (v) gives the outdegree of v, d
+
D(v).
For a digraph D we can define the underlying graph G by replacing each arc
a = uv in A by an edge e = uv. We write G(D) for the underlying graph of
D. Conversely, for a given graph G = (V,E), we define the associated digraph
by replacing each edge e = uv ∈ E with two arcs a = uv and −a = vu. The
digraph associated with G is denoted D(G).
A digraph D is said to be connected if the underlying graph G(D) is con-
nected. If there is a path from any node to any other node in D, the digraph
is strongly connected.
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Figure 2.5: Example of digraph with six vertices and six arcs
For analyses in this thesis it is useful to define a network.
Definition 2.11. A network N = N(X, Y ) is a digraph D = (V,A) with
two disjoint node sets, a set X ⊂ V of sources and a set Y ⊂ V of sinks
as well as a non-negative capacity function c : A → R. Sources v ∈ X can
be seen as supply nodes and sinks v ∈ Y as demand nodes. Nodes that are
neither sources nor sinks are called intermediary nodes and the set of these
nodes are denoted I where I = V \(X ∪ Y ).
Let f : A → R be a real-valued function defined on the arcset of a digraph
D(V,A). We introduce the following notation: For S ⊂ A, let f(S) =∑
a∈S f(a). We let ∂
+(X) denote the set of arcs with tail in X and head in
V \X, and ∂−(X) the set of arcs with head in X and tail in V \X. We then
define f+(X) = f(∂+(X)) and f−(X) = f(∂−(X)).
We say that f is a flow in N(X, Y ) if
f+(v) = f−(v) for all v ∈ I.
That is for any node that is not a sink or a source, the incoming flow equals
the outgoing flow. Since each arc has a capacity c(a) we require flow to
satisfy the capacity constraint
0 ≤ f(a) ≤ c(a) for all a ∈ A. (2.1)
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In certain problems, like in this thesis, we require sources to ”send” and sinks
to ”receive” a certain flow. We define k : V → R as the function of required
net flow from sinks and sources. We can then add two feasibility constraints
f+(v)− f−(v) = k(v) > 0 ∀ v ∈ X, (2.2)
f+(v)− f−(v) = k(v) < 0 ∀ v ∈ Y. (2.3)
A flow is feasible if the two constraints 2.2 and 2.3 as well as the capacity
constraint 2.1 are satisfied.
We also introduce a related concept, circulation. Define the real-valued func-
tion f : A → R on a digraph D. We say that f is a circulation if for every
vertex v ∈ V (D)
f+(v)− f−(v) = 0,
that is inflow equals outflow for all vertices v ∈ V (D).
2.4.3 Network characteristics
To characterize large, complex networks it is useful to define concepts that
describe features of the network topology that seem to arise frequently. Such
descriptions might enable us to categorize and order networks accordingly.
The definitions in this section are taken from [25].
Distance
Distance measures are often important in graphs. The geodesic distance
d(i, j) is defined as the minimum number of links separating node i from
node j. In a graph both the average distance and the maximum distance
are of interest. To define those two measures, it is useful to introduce a
probability distribution specifying the fraction ω¯(r) of node pairs at distance
r
ω¯(r) =
|{(i, j) ∈ N ×N : d(i, j) = r}|
n(n− 1) . (2.4)
We can then define the average network distance to be
d¯ =
∑
0<r<∞
rω¯(r), (2.5)
and the diameter of the network to be
dˆ = max{r : ω¯(r) > 0}. (2.6)
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Connectivity
Another important property of a graph is the degree to which it is intercon-
nected. We talk about two types of connectivity, node connectivity and edge
connectivity.
Definition 2.12. Let G = (V,E) be a connected undirected graph. The
subset V ′ ⊂ V is a vertex cut if and only if removal of the nodes in V ′
renders the graph G disconnected. The vertex connectivity k(G) is the size
of the smallest vertex cut.
The definition of edge connectivity is analogous.
Definition 2.13. Let G = (V,E) be a connected undirected graph. The
subset E ′ ⊂ E is an edge cut if and only if removal of the edges in E ′ renders
the graph disconnected. The edge connectivity λ(G) is the size of the smallest
edge cut.
Connectivity is an important concept in robustness analyses of graphs. An
example is found in [7], where the authors argue that the most robust com-
munication network for military applications is one with optimal connectivity,
which is when k(G) = λ(G) = dmin where dmin is the minimum degree of G.
Clustering
An important feature of a network is its clustering. For each node, i, its
clustering coefficient Ci is defined as the fraction of pairs of neighbors that
are themselves neighbors. Formally, for the network G = (V,E) and any
node i ∈ V , the clustering is given by
Ci ≡ |{jk ∈ E : ij ∈ E and ik ∈ E}|
d(i)(d(i)−1)
2
. (2.7)
In terms of the adjacency matrix A, it can be written as
Ci =
∑
j<k aijaikajk∑
j<k aijaik
. (2.8)
If node i has less than two neighbors, we define Ci ≡ 0. We can then define
the clustering coefficient of the network as the average clustering over all
nodes in the network
C =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ci. (2.9)
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Cohesiveness
Cohesiveness applies to arbitrary subset of nodes in a network. A set is
cohesive if the proportion of links that go out of the set is low, i.e. the nodes
in the set are for the most connected to each other. Let U ⊂ V be a subset
of nodes in V . For each node i in U we calculate the fraction of links that
lie within U
H i(U) =
|{ij ∈ E : j ∈ U |
d(i)
. (2.10)
The overall cohesiveness of the set is then defined as the minimum fraction
across all nodes in U
H(U) = min
i∈U
H i(U). (2.11)
2.4.4 Graph rewiring and small world networks
When networks are large and irregular, so-called complex networks, it is
useful to define certain high level characteristics to describe the network
structure.
Often when we are interested in analyzing the role network structure plays,
like in this thesis, the effect of adding or removing edges from a graph is
more or less trivial. The effect of changing the structure of connections by
having a fixed number of edges and vertices by ”rewiring” the edges, that is
moving them to other vertices, is usually complicated to analyze, but could
be of great interest.
The process of graph rewiring can be done in various ways, but a standard
approach that will be used for simulations in this thesis, is to start with some
sort of regular graph, and then to move the end of each edge e = (u, v) in the
graph with probability p from v to a vertex w chosen uniformly at random.
Arguably the most used rewiring model is the Watts and Strogatz model,
a rewiring procedure used to produce graphs with small-world properties,
including short average path length and high degree of clustering [27]. Given
a graph of size n and average degree k, the algorithm is as follows:
1. Generate a k-regular ring lattice.
2. For every edge e = (u, v), rewire it with probability p to e = (u,w)
where w is chosen with uniform probability from all vertices that avoid
loops and link duplication.
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removed from a clustered neighbourhood to make a short cut has, at
most, a linear effect on C; hence C(p) remains practically unchanged
for small p even though L(p) drops rapidly. The important implica-
tion here is that at the local level (as reflected by C(p)), the transition
to a small world is almost undetectable. To check the robustness of
these results, we have tested many different types of initial regular
graphs, as well as different algorithms for random rewiring, and all
give qualitatively similar results. The only requirement is that the
rewired edges must typically connect vertices that would otherwise
be much farther apart than Lrandom.
The idealized construction above reveals the key role of short
cuts. It suggests that the small-world phenomenon might be
common in sparse networks with many vertices, as even a tiny
fraction of short cuts would suffice. To test this idea, we have
computed L and C for the collaboration graph of actors in feature
films (generated from data available at http://us.imdb.com), the
electrical power grid of the western United States, and the neural
network of the nematode worm C. elegans17. All three graphs are of
scientific interest. The graph of film actors is a surrogate for a social
network18, with the advantage of being much more easily specified.
It is also akin to the graph of mathematical collaborations centred,
traditionally, on P. Erdo¨s (partial data available at http://
www.acs.oakland.edu/,grossman/erdoshp.html). The graph of
the power grid is relevant to the efficiency and robustness of
power networks19. And C. elegans is the sole example of a completely
mapped neural network.
Table 1 shows that all three graphs are small-world networks.
These examples were not hand-picked; they were chosen because of
their inherent interest and because complete wiring diagrams were
available. Thus the small-world phenomenon is not merely a
curiosity of social networks13,14 nor an artefact of an idealized
model—it is probably generic for many large, sparse networks
found in nature.
We now investigate the functional significance of small-world
connectivity for dynamical systems. Our test case is a deliberately
simplified model for the spread of an infectious disease. The
population structure is modelled by the family of graphs described
in Fig. 1. At time t ¼ 0, a single infective individual is introduced
into an otherwise healthy population. Infective individuals are
removed permanently (by immunity or death) after a period of
sickness that lasts one unit of dimensionless time. During this time,
each infective individual can infect each of its healthy neighbours
with probability r. On subsequent time steps, the disease spreads
along the edges of the graph until it either infects the entire
population, or it dies out, having infected some fraction of the
population in the process.
p = 0 p = 1 
Increasing randomness
Regular Small-world Random
Figure 1 Random rewiring procedure for interpolating between a regular ring
lattice and a random network, without altering the number of vertices or edges in
the graph. We start with a ring of n vertices, each connected to its k nearest
neighbours by undirected edges. (For clarity, n ¼ 20 and k ¼ 4 in the schematic
examples shown here, but much larger n and k are used in the rest of this Letter.)
We choose a vertex and the edge that connects it to its nearest neighbour in a
clockwise sense. With probability p, we reconnect this edge to a vertex chosen
uniformly at random over the entire ring, with duplicate edges forbidden; other-
wise we leave the edge in place. We repeat this process by moving clockwise
around the ring, considering each vertex in turn until one lap is completed. Next,
we consider the edges that connect vertices to their second-nearest neighbours
clockwise. As before, we randomly rewire each of these edges with probability p,
and continue this process, circulating around the ring and proceeding outward to
more distant neighbours after each lap, until each edge in the original lattice has
been considered once. (As there are nk/2 edges in the entire graph, the rewiring
process stops after k/2 laps.) Three realizations of this process are shown, for
different values of p. For p ¼ 0, the original ring is unchanged; as p increases, the
graph becomes increasingly disordered until for p ¼ 1, all edges are rewired
randomly. One of our main results is that for intermediate values of p, the graph is
a small-world network: highly clustered like a regular graph, yet with small
characteristic path length, like a random graph. (See Fig. 2.)
Table 1 Empirical examples of small-world networks
Lactual Lrandom Cactual Crandom
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Film actors 3.65 2.99 0.79 0.00027
Power grid 18.7 12.4 0.080 0.005
C. elegans 2.65 2.25 0.28 0.05
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Characteristic path length L and clustering coefficient C for three real networks, compared
to random graphs with the same number of vertices (n) and average number of edges per
vertex (k). (Actors: n ¼ 225;226, k ¼ 61. Power grid: n ¼ 4;941, k ¼ 2:67. C. elegans: n ¼ 282,
k ¼ 14.) The graphs are defined as follows. Two actors are joined by an edge if they have
acted in a film together. We restrict attention to the giant connected component16 of this
graph, which includes ,90% of all actors listed in the Internet Movie Database (available at
http://us.imdb.com), as of April 1997. For the power grid, vertices represent generators,
transformers and substations, and edges represent high-voltage transmission lines
between them. For C. elegans, an edge joins two neurons if they are connected by either
a synapse or a gap junction. We treat all edges as undirected and unweighted, and all
vertices as identical, recognizing that these are crude approximations. All three networks
show the small-world phenomenon: L ) Lrandom but C q Crandom.
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Figure 2 Characteristic path length L(p) and clustering coefficient C(p) for the
family of randomly rewired graphs described in Fig. 1. Here L is defined as the
number of edges in the shortest path between two vertices, averaged over all
pairs of vertices. The clustering coefficient C(p) is defined as follows. Suppose
that a vertex v has kv neighbours; then at most kvðkv 2 1Þ=2 edges can exist
between them (this occurs when every neighbour of v is connected to everyother
neighbour of v). Let Cv denote the fraction of these allowable edges that actually
exist. Define C as the average of Cv over all v. For friendship networks, these
statistics have intuitive meanings: L is the average number of friendships in the
shortest chain connecting two people; Cv reflects the extent to which friends of v
are also friends of each other; and thus C measures the cliquishness of a typical
friendship circle. The data shown in the figure are averages over 20 random
realizations of the rewiring process described in Fig.1, and have been normalized
by the values L(0), C(0) for a regular lattice. All the graphs have n ¼ 1;000 vertices
and an average degree of k ¼ 10 edges per vertex. We note that a logarithmic
horizontal scale has been used to resolve the rapid drop in L(p), corresponding to
the onset of the small-world phenomenon. During this drop, C(p) remains almost
constant at its value for the regular lattice, indicating that the transition to a small
world is almost undetectable at the local level.
Figure 2.6: Lattice rewired with different probabilities
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give qualitatively similar results. The only requirement is that the
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cuts. It suggests that the small-world phenomenon might be
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fraction of short cuts would suffice. To test this idea, we have
computed L and C for the collaboration graph of actors in feature
films (generated from data available at http://us.imdb.com), the
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network of the nematode worm C. elegans17. All three graphs are of
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their inherent interest and because complete wiring diagrams were
available. Thus the small-world phenomenon is not merely a
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found in nature.
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We choose a vertex and the edge that connects it to its nearest neighbour in a
clockwise sense. With probability p, we reconnect this edge to a vertex chosen
uniformly at random over the entire ring, with duplicate edges forbidden; other-
wise we leave the edge in place. We repeat this process by moving clockwise
around the ring, considering each vertex in turn until one lap is completed. Next,
we consider the edges that connect vertices to their second-nearest neighbours
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and continue this process, circulating around the ring and proceeding outward to
more distant neighbours after each lap, until each edge in the original lattice has
been considered once. (As there are nk/2 edges in the entire graph, the rewiring
process stops after k/2 laps.) Three realizations of this process are shown, for
different values of p. For p ¼ 0, the original ring is unchanged; as p increases, the
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Film actors 3.65 2.99 0.79 0.00027
Power grid 18.7 12.4 0.080 0.005
C. elegans 2.65 2.25 0.28 0.05
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Characteristic path length L and clustering coefficient C for three real networks, compared
to random graphs with the same number of vertices (n) and average number of edges per
vertex (k). (Actors: n ¼ 225;226, k ¼ 61. Power grid: n ¼ 4;941, k ¼ 2:67. C. elegans: n ¼ 282,
k ¼ 14.) The graphs are defined as follows. Two actors are joined by an edge if they have
acted in a film together. We restrict attention to the giant connected component16 of this
graph, which includes ,90% of all actors listed in the Internet Movie Database (available at
http://us.imdb.com), as of April 1997. For the power grid, vertices represent generators,
transformers and substations, and edges represent high-voltage transmission lines
between them. For C. elegans, an edge joins two neurons if they are connected by either
a synapse or a gap junctio . We treat all edges as undirected and unweighted, nd all
vertices as identical, recognizing that these are crude approximations. All three networks
show the small-world phenomenon: L ) Lrandom but C q Crandom.
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Figure 2 Characteristic path length L(p) and clustering coefficient C(p) for the
family of randomly rewired graphs described in Fig. 1. Here L is defined as the
number of edges in the shortest path between two vertices, averaged over all
pairs of vertices. The clustering coefficient C(p) is defined as follows. Suppose
that a vertex v has kv neighbours; then at most kvðkv 2 1Þ=2 edges can exist
between them (this occurs when every neighbour of v is connected to everyother
neighbour of v). Let Cv denote the fraction of these allowable edges that actually
exist. Define C as the average of Cv over all v. For friendship networks, these
statistics have intuitive meanings: L is the average number of friendships in the
shortest chain connecting two people; Cv reflects the extent to which friends of v
are also friends of each other; and thus C measures the cliquishness of a typical
friendship circle. The data shown in the figure are averages over 20 random
realizations of the rewiring process described in Fig.1, and have been normalized
by the values L(0), C(0) for a regular lattice. All the graphs have n ¼ 1;000 vertices
and an average degree of k ¼ 10 edges per vertex. We note that a logarithmic
horizontal scale has been used to resolve the rapid drop in L(p), corresponding to
the onset of the small-world phenomenon. During this drop, C(p) remains almost
constant at its value for the regular lattice, indicating that the transition to a small
world is almost undetectable at the local level.
Figure 2.7: Clustering and diameter as function of rewiring probability
A r wiring probability of 0 returns the k-regular ri g lattice, while p = 1 gives
a random graph. For the right choice of p we get graphs with a high degree
of clustering, bu a low average distance. Thes g aphs play an important
role in modeling real-world networks, since networks with such properties
ar often observed empirically. Graphs with these properties are called small
world networks. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 are taken from Watts and Strogatz
o i inal paper [27].
Chapter3
The model
The thesis builds on a model of financial contagion in networks introduced
by Allen and Gale in [2]. In this chapter we will present the model and the
most important theoretical results. Some aspects relevant for the thesis will
be presented and discussed in more general terms than what is done in the
original paper. The notation will deviate slightly from Allen and Gale to
ensure consistency with notation used for analyses in later chapters.
The model explains how a regional liquidity shock, can result in bankruptcy
not only in that region, but, under certain conditions, spread to other regions
as well. This is possible because regions are interconnected through claims
that banks in different regions have on each other.
We consider a world of banks and consumers, where consumers hold deposits
in banks. The banks invest the deposits in a portfolio of short- and long-
term assets, such that they can meet the expected demand for liquidity at
different time steps by liquidating the short and long-term asset respectively.
Aggregate consumer demand for liquidity is known, but there is regional
uncertainty with regards to consumer liquidity preferences. The problem of
meeting the demand for liquidity at different time steps is therefore a problem
of redistributing liquidity from regions with low demand to regions with high
demand. By holding deposits in other regions, banks can ensure that the
necessary redistribution can be achieved. When a bank faces high demand
for liquidity, it can liquidate bank deposits in other regions to meet demand.
As long as the actual demand for liquidity equals the expected demand for
liquidity, the interbank market of deposits ensures the necessary redistri-
bution of liquidity, and the demand can be met. But what happens if an
23
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unexpected event, a liquidity shock, occurs, and the demand for liquidity
exceeds the expected demand.
Allen and Gale’s model provides a formal framework to analyze the effects
of a liquidity shock in a region on the broader economy. In their paper,
they analyze the model in a four-region world for two symmetric market
structures. It is shown that even a small perturbation in terms of a liquidity
shock in a region can spread through the interbank market and result in a
global crisis. In later chapters we will analyze the model for more general
network structures.
3.1 Basic assumptions and preferences
There are two types of players in the world; consumers and banks, and three
different time steps, t = 0, 1, 2. Consumers are assumed to be identical and
in large numbers, each endowed with one unit of a homogeneous consumption
good, from now on assumed to be the nume´raire. At time t = 0, consumers
can choose to deposit their endowments in banks, which in turn can invest
in assets that yield returns for future consumption. There are two types of
assets; short-term and long-term. Short-term assets give a return of 1 unit
at time 1. Long-term assets pay a return r < 1 if liquidated at time 1 or
R > 1 at time 2, so it is costly to liquidate the long-term asset at t = 1. The
banks want to meet demand for liquidity at t = 1 by liquidating the short
term asset, and demand at t = 2 by liquidating the long term asset. Each
consumer is either an early consumer, with preference for liquidity at t = 1,
or a late consumer with preference for liquidity at time t = 2. The consumer
type is unknown at t = 0 and revealed at t = 1. At t = 0, the expected
fraction of early consumers is γ.
At t = 0, banks offer consumers a contract that consumers can choose to
accept. The market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, such that banks
offer the consumers a contract that maximizes the consumers’ utility. The
utility maximizing allocation is given by (x, y, c1, c2) where x is the share in-
vested in long-term asset, y is the share of deposits banks invest in short term
assets, c1 is the amount of consumption offered to consumers that withdraw
at t = 1, and c2 the returns to consumers if they withdraw at t = 2.
At t = 1, consumers decide whether to withdraw their deposits at t = 1
or t = 2, and banks liquidate assets to meet demand from their depositors.
Early consumers always withdraw at t = 1. Late consumers withdraw at
t = 1 or t = 2 depending on what gives the most consumption. It is assumed
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Figure 3.1: Events at different time steps
that late consumers withdraw deposits at t = 2 if it is weakly optimal for
them, that is if the amount of consumption they get by withdrawing at t = 2
is at least as large as what they would get by withdrawing at t = 1. If the
banks cannot meet the demands of consumers, they must liquidate all assets
at t = 1. The proceeds are then split equally among the depositors.
Each consumer has the following utility function
U(c1, c2) =
{
u(c1) with probability ω,
u(c2) with probability 1− ω,
where ct denotes consumption at date t ∈ {1, 2}. The utility function u(·)
is assumed to be monotone, strictly concave and twice continuously differen-
tiable.
The economy we consider consists of a number of regions. Regions can be
interpreted as geographical regions, but could also represent single banks, or
a group of financial intermediaries that operate in the same market. The
regions are connected by banks’ possibility to hold deposits in banks in other
regions. All regions face the same optimization problem, and the fraction of
early consumers across all regions is known to be γ, so there is no aggregate
uncertainty of demand. Regions are in one of two categories; either a region
has a higher share of early consumers ωH , or a lower share of early consumers
ωL. The expected demand γ is thus γ = (ωH + ωL)/2.
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3.2 Optimal allocation
In the model we assume there is a central planner that seeks to maximize
the consumers’ utility. The optimization problem faced by the planner is
to find the contract (x, y, c1, c2) that maximizes the consumers’ utility. All
consumers in a region are ex-ante identical to consumers in other regions
and can be treated alike, such that every early consumer gets c1 units of
consumption and every late consumer receives c2 units.
The ex ante expected utility for a consumer is γu(c1) + (1 − γ)u(c2). At
time t = 0 the planner invests in a portfolio (x, y) ≥ 0 where x and y are the
shares of a bank’s investments in long term and short term assets respectively.
x and y must satisfy the feasibility constraint x + y ≤ 1. Furthermore,
because of the higher returns, but at the same time the cost of premature
liquidation associated with the long-term assets, it is optimal to provide for
consumption at t = 1 by liquidation of the short-term asset, and to provide
for consumption at t = 2 by liquidation of the long-term asset. Since the
expected fraction of early consumers is γ, this can be achieved if the two
feasibility constraints γc1 ≤ y and (1− γ)c2 ≤ Rx are satisfied.
With the given restrictions on the utility function and under the feasibility
constraints, we can formulate the optimization problem faced by the central
planner. The problem is a nonlinear, concave maximization problem over a
convex domain. The solution is the first-best allocation (x, y, c1, c2):
maximize
x,y,c1,c2
γu(c1) + (1− γ)u(c2),
subject to x+ y ≤ 1,
γc1 ≤ y,
(1− γ)c2 ≤ Rx.
(3.1)
From monotonicity of u, it follows that all constraints must be binding. We
can thus express c2 in terms of c1:
c2 =
R(1− γc1)
1− γ .
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We can then solve the first-order optimality condition
du
dc1
= 0,
γu′(c1) + (1− γ)
(−Rγ
1− γ
)
u′(c2) = 0,
u′(c1) = Ru′(c2),
u′(c1) ≥ u′(c2).
The condition c1 ≤ c2 is called the incentive compatibility constraint. We
observe that if c1 > c2, late consumers would get more consumption by
withdrawing in period t = 1 than in period t = 2, so they would prefer to
mimic early consumers and withdraw early. By concavity of u, u′(c1) ≥ u′(c2)
implies that c1 ≤ c2. This shows that the incentive-efficient allocation is the
same as the first-best allocation.
3.2.1 Interbank market
In Allen and Gale’s paper, the market consists of four regions that are ex-ante
equal; A, B, C and D. The share of early consumers in a region, ω, varies
from region to region. There are two possible values of ω; a higher value,
ωH , and a lower value, ωL, such that 0 < ωL < ωH < 1. The realization of ω
in a region depends on the state of nature. There are two states that occur
with the same probability, σ1 and σ2. The possible realizations are given in
table 3.1. We see that although there is regional uncertainty about demand,
the correlation pattern of high and low demand regions is known.
A B C D
σ1 ωH ωL ωH ωL
σ2 ωL ωH ωL ωH
Table 3.1: States of the world
At t = 1 the state of nature is revealed. If a region has a high share ωH of
early consumers, it faces a liquidity deficit of (ωH−γ)c1 after liquidating the
short-term assets. We denote by z the difference between the higher share
of early consumers and the expected share of early consumers, such that
z = ωH − γ. Similarly, regions with a low share ωL of early consumers have
a liquidity surplus of (γ − ωL)c1 = −(ωH − γ)c1 = −zc1. There is enough
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liquidity in the market, but it is inefficiently distributed across regions. For
simplicity, when we talk about demand at different time steps, we will for
most of the analysis omit c1 and c2, and consider the normalized demand,
that is the share of consumers that withdraw at a time step.
This maldistribution of liquidity motivates the existence of an interbank mar-
ket where banks exchange deposits across regions. At time t = 0, banks
transfer deposits to banks in other regions. Then, at t = 1, banks with
high demand for liquidity can liquidate holdings in other banks to meet the
demand. Banks with low demand keep their deposits in other banks until
t = 2.
The assumptions we make about bank behavior at the different time steps
are thus
1. At t = 0 banks place deposits in banks in adjacent regions. The de-
posits are the minimum possible, such that demand for liquidity can
be met at t = 1 and t = 2 given the following protocol:
2. At t = 1 banks liquidate deposits in other regions if necessary to meet
demand for liquidity.
3. At t = 2 banks liquidate remaining deposits in other regions.
We will see that the behavior described above is consistent with a pareto
efficient subgame perfect equilibrium if one of the two states σ1 or σ2 is
realized at t = 1.
Subgame perfect equilibrium
The next step is to specify the game played by banks and to show that the
planner’s optimal contract can be implemented as a subgame perfect equi-
librium. Assume that (x, y, c1, c2) is the utility maximizing contract for the
consumers proposed by the central planner. Furthermore, perfect competi-
tion between banks in a region is assumed, such that the contract offered by
a bank is the optimal contract for consumers.
When the contract is accepted and the banks have invested accordingly in
short- and long-term assets, banks will seek to ensure that the contract is
implemented at subsequent time steps, and consumers will seek to maximize
their utility. The consumers and banks then face the following strategic
choices:
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• At t = 0: Banks choose how much to deposit in adjacent regions.
• At t = 1: Consumers choose whether to liquidate bank deposits. Banks
choose how much of the deposits in other regions to liquidate.
• At t = 2: Banks and consumers liquidate all remaining claims.
Through these choices, the banks must make sure that consumers who liqui-
date their deposits at t = 1, receive c1 per unit, and consumers who liquidate
at t = 2, receive c2. This game can be solved by backward induction. At
t = 0, banks place deposits in other banks to be able to meet consumer de-
mand for liquidity at t = 1 and t = 2, regardless of which of the two states, σ1
or σ2, is realized. At t = 1, the banks liquidate bank deposits such that they
can meet demand at that period, but preferably also at t = 2. At t = 1, early
consumers always withdraw, and late consumers withdraw if and only if it is
strictly optimal, that is if it yields strictly higher returns than withdrawing
late.
Since there is enough liquidity across regions at t = 1 and t = 2, assume there
exist transfers f and g between regions at t = 1 and t = 2 respectively, where
f(uv) is a transfer from u to v at t = 1 and g(uv) is a transfer from u to v at
t = 2. Assume that w is a set of deposits placed between banks in different
regions at t = 0 where w(uv) is a deposit placed by region u in region v.
Then, if the following conditions hold at the same time for all regions, the
choices of w, f and g are strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium such
that the first best optimum is implemented.
1. Transfers f can be achieved through withdrawal of deposits w at t = 1,
that is f(uv) ≤ w(vu).
2. Transfers g can be achieved through withdrawal of deposits w at t = 2,
that is g(uv) ≤ w(vu).
3. For both to be achieved at the same time, we must have g(uv)+f(uv) ≤
w(vu).
That this is a subgame perfect equilibrium follows: No bank can implement
the first-best contract without transfers from other banks, and since the de-
posits w achieve the first-best, no bank has incentive to deviate from w. At
the subsequent time steps, deficit regions have incentives to withdraw ac-
cording to the scheme f that ensures that demand can be met. Withdrawals
can be enforced, that is a bank cannot keep another bank from liquidating its
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own deposits, and surplus regions will therefore adhere to the scheme f . The
same argument holds for t = 2. Therefore, the strategy is a Nash equilibrium
in all subgames including the game itself, and we can conclude that it is a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
The size and structure of deposits in this equilibrium depends on the graph
structure. In later chapters we will consider a variety of graph structures, but
we will first repeat the analyses from [2] of two regular graphs; the directed
cycle and the complete graph with four nodes.
A
D
B
C
Student Version of MATLAB
(a) Directed cycle
A B
CD
Student Version of MATLAB
(b) Complete graph
Figure 3.2: Network structures analyzed by Allen and Gale
Directed circle
We first consider the directed cycle with alternating node types. In the
directed cycle every region is connected to only one other region. Early
consumer regions are connected to a late consumer region and vice versa.
First we consider an early consumer region. Both the in-neighbor and the
out-neighbor are late consumer regions. At t = 1, the region needs to meet
demand from a share ωH of consumers in the region. Since the in-neighbor is
an early consumer region, it does not want to liquidate its bank deposits, so
the total demand is ωH , and by liquidating the short-term asset the region
can obtain γ. The deficit, which it will have to cover by liquidating its deposit
in the adjacent region, is ωH − γ = z. The transfer at t = 0 to meet the
demand at t = 1 must be at least z. At t = 2, the early consumer region has
a surplus of z from liquidating the long term asset. The in-neighbor has a
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deficit of z, so it will liquidate its deposit, which must be of size z. We can
see that demand will be met for both kind of nodes at all times.
Complete graph
The first-best solution in the 4-node complete graph G can be achieved if
banks in region u deposit w(uv) = (ωH − γ)/2 = z/2 in all other regions
v ∈ NG(u). To see this, observe that at time t = 1 there will be a liquidity
surplus z in the two late consumer regions and an equally sized liquidity
deficit in the two early consumer regions. This is the total transfer needed
from late consumer regions to early consumer regions to cover the deficit.
Each region is connected to two regions of different type than itself, and by
depositing z/2 at t = 0 in each of them, (ωH − γ) liquidity can be obtained
at period t = 1 by liquidating deposits in other banks. Note that for the
complete graph, transfers between banks in regions of the same type, that is
the cross-links in figure 3.2(b), are not needed to achieve the first-best. The
same insurance could be obtained from only placing deposits in regions of
different type. Regions of the same type face the same demand at the same
time, so the mutual claims they hold on each other will cancel out. Allen
and Gale, however, assume that all deposits are the same size, and that all
links are used. As we will discuss briefly in a later chapter, even if not all
edges in a graph are necessary to achieve the first best optimum, including
them will generally make the market more resilient towards liquidity shocks.
We see that the deposits each bank must hold in adjacent banks is z for the
directed cycle, but only half the size z/2 for the complete graph. This differ-
ence will play a central role for the robustness of the two market structures
when we consider the effect of an unexpected liquidity shock.
Liquidation order
In order to ensure that banks liquidate assets in a certain order, Allen and
Gale introduce another condition that induces a ”natural” order to liquidate
assets:
1. Short-term assets.
2. Bank deposits.
3. Long-term assets.
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This particular order is motivated by the cost of liquidating the different
assets. A short-term asset is by definition an asset that can be liquidated
early, a long-term asset could correspond to building infrastructure, investing
in knowledge or similar investments where there the returns are strongly
dependent on a longer time horizon, and premature liquidation is costly. A
bank deposit should be in between those two. The payoff to investing in the
different assets depends on the time perspective, such that short-term assets
yield the least returns and long-term assets the most. Having decided the
order we want the banks to liquidate their assets, we need to ensure that this
is reflected in the model. The short-term asset is worth one unit in period
t = 1, and one unit if it is reinvested at t = 2, so the cost of liquidating is
1. Liquidating the deposit at period t = 1 gives c1 in that period but costs
c2 in future consumption, so the cost is c2/c1. Since we want deposits to be
liquidated after the short-term asset, we need to have c2/c1 > 1. We know
from the first-order condition that c2 > c1, so the condition always holds.
Furthermore, the long-term asset at t = 1 gives r units of consumption, but
costs R units of future consumption, so the cost of liquidating early is R/r.
The condition R/r > c2/c1 ensures that the bank liquidates its assets in the
desired order.
If a bank goes bankrupt, all the bank’s assets are liquidated and all depositors
withdraw as much as possible from the bank.
3.3 Liquidity shocks
As long as one of the two states σ1 or σ2 is realized, we have seen that the
first-best solution can be achieved through an interbank market of deposits.
We will now consider the occurrence of unexpected high demand for liquidity
in a region at t = 1. We introduce a state σ¯, which is assigned zero probability
at time t = 0 and has higher total demand for liquidity than the other states.
The three states are presented in table 3.2:
A B C D
σ1 ωH ωL ωH ωL
σ2 ωL ωH ωL ωH
σ¯ γ +  γ γ γ
Table 3.2: Regional liquidity shock
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We see that the average demand for liquidity at t = 1 is γ in σ1 and σ2, but
γ + /4 for an  > 0 in σ¯. Since σ¯ is assigned zero probability, the expected
demand at t = 0 remains γ, and the optimal contract does not change. The
equilibrium in states σ1 and σ2 will be the same as before.
3.3.1 Equilibrium behavior
It is assumed that banks have full information about the demand for liquidity
at t = 1. If σ¯ is realized, the total demand for liquidity in the market cannot
be met by liquidating the short-term assets alone. To avoid liquidating the
long-term assets, all banks will therefore immediately withdraw all deposits
from other banks. Since the claims a bank holds in other regions equals
the claims held by banks in other region on that bank, the banks cannot
obtain liquidity from other regions, which implies that the regions must be
self-sufficient. This will, under certain conditions, lead to bankruptcy in the
region where the liquidity shock occurred, and might spread to other regions.
For a modification of Allen and Gale’s model, such that banks under certain
circumstances can be willing to liquidate some long-term assets before bank
deposits to avoid spread of a crisis, see [22].
Buffers and liquidation values
If a bank faces demand for liquidity that cannot be met by liquidating short-
term assets and bank deposits alone, the bank is said to be insolvent. If
state σ¯ is realized, it is easy to see that this is the case in the region where
the shock occurred. By liquidating short-term assets, the bank can meet a
demand of γc1, but the actual demand is (γ+)c1. There is thus a shortage of
liquidity of c1. However, insolvency does not necessarily imply bankruptcy.
A bank can afford to liquidate some of the long-term assets prematurely
without causing late consumers to withdraw at t = 1 and hence cause a bank
run. The condition c1 ≤ c2 cannot be violated, that is late consumers must
get at least c1 at t = 2, if not they would be better off withdrawing at time
t = 1. This condition implies that the following inequality must hold:
(1− ω)c1 ≤ R(x− β),
where ω is the share of early consumers and β is the amount of long-term
assets liquidated at t = 1. This gives the maximum amount of long-term
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assets that can be liquidated prematurely without causing a bank run
β = x− (1− ω)c1
R
We can then define the bank’s buffer b(ω), the amount that can be obtained
by liquidating the long-term asset at t = 1:
b(ω) ≡ r
(
x− (1− ω)c1
R
)
. (3.2)
If the excess demand for liquidity is smaller than the buffer, that is the
amount of liquidity that can be obtained by liquidating long-term assets
prematurely, late consumers will still prefer to withdraw at t = 2 and the
bank avoids a bank run. This gives the following criteria for the bank to
avoid a run and thus bankruptcy:
c1 ≤ b(γ + ). (3.3)
When this condition is satisfied, the bank itself is able to absorb the liquid-
ity shock. It is insolvent, but not bankrupt, and the other regions will be
unaffected. For all of the thesis this condition is assumed violated.
If condition (3.3) is violated, banks in the region will go bankrupt. We assume
this is the case in region v. Then all depositors withdraw their holdings at
t = 1. The bank cannot fully repay the depositors. We denote the value
of a unit deposit in the bankrupt bank in region v with qv, assuming that
all depositors split the bank’s values equally. The total demand for liquidity
is 1 from the consumers and
∑
u∈NG(v)w(uv) from banks in other regions
that hold deposits in the region v. The total demand from all depositors
is thus 1 +
∑
u∈NG(v)w(uv). By liquidating all assets at t = 1, banks in
region v can obtain liquid means of value y + rx +
∑
u∈NG(v)w(vu)qv from
liquidating short-term assets, long-term assets, and bank deposits. The value
of a deposit qv in v is
qv =
y + rx+
∑
u∈NG(v)w(uv)qv
1 +
∑
u∈NG(v)w(vu)
, (3.4)
where qv < c1.
If we assume that no regions other than v are bankrupt, we have qv = c1 for
all u ∈ NG(v). This gives an upper bound q¯v on the value qv:
qv ≤ q¯v =
y + rx+
∑
u∈N(v)w(uv)c1
1 +
∑
u∈N(v)w(vu)
. (3.5)
As we will see in the next chapter, we can find transfers such that w(uv) =
w(vu) for all undirected connected graphs.
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3.3.2 Spillover effect and contagion
We now consider the situation when state σ¯ is realized, and region v is subject
to a sufficiently large liquidity shock , such that condition (3.3) is violated.
The bank cannot meet the claims from all its depositors and will go bankrupt.
The bank needs to liquidate all its assets and deposits.
The value of deposits and assets in the bankrupt region is qv where qv <
c1. This means that deposits held in the bankrupt bank have lost value,
consequently banks that hold deposits in the bankrupt region v will suffer
a loss when the deposits are liquidated. This spillover effect will make the
banks in neighboring regions insolvent, and if the spillover effect is sufficiently
large, it can lead to bankruptcy. The spillover effect from a bankrupt region
v to its neighbors u ∈ NG(v) must be the difference between the claims banks
in region v hold on u, w(vu)c1 and the actual value of the claims, w(vu)qi.
We can thus find a lower bound on the spillover effect
w(vu)(c1 − qv) ≥ w(vu)(c1 − q¯v). (3.6)
If the spillover from v to u exceeds the buffer in u, we will have the same effect
as when the buffer was exceeded in v; u will face bankruptcy. A necessary
condition for banks in region u to avoid bankruptcy when v is bankrupt,
must therefore be
w(vu)(c1 − q¯v) ≤ b(γ). (3.7)
Conversely, if the lower bound exceeds the buffer, we have a sufficient con-
dition to guarantee bankruptcy in region u.
It is easy to see that if u faces bankruptcy, u’s neighbors will also be subject
to losses caused by the bankruptcies in v and u. If the spillover effects from
u and v cause new regions to become bankrupt, we might see a domino effect
of a crisis spreading from region to region, and this is what is characterized
by Allen and Gale as financial contagion.
Allen and Gale show how this effect plays out in two different graph struc-
tures: The directed cycle and the complete graph, and we will see that the
complete market is more robust than the directed cycle.
Directed cycle
The first graph structure analyzed by Allen and Gale is the directed cycle.
As shown previously, every bank transfers z = ωH − γ to the adjacent region
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at t = 0. In the four-region network (figure 3.2(a)), A holds a deposit of z in
region B, B in C and so on. Assume that the unexpected state σ¯ is realized,
such that A has γ +  early consumers. Furthermore, assume that (3.3) is
violated, such that banks in region A cannot avoid bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
in region A leads to a loss for region D. If the spillover from A to D exceeds
the buffer of D, D will be bankrupt. By using the lower bound on the spillover
effect (3.7), we get the following sufficient condition for D to go bankrupt
given bankruptcy in A:
z(c1 − q¯A) > b(γ).
Since all regions are identical in terms of the size of deposits placed in adja-
cent banks and their positions in the network, it is easy to show that if the
condition above is satisfied, not only will D be bankrupt, but C and B will
be bankrupt as well.
In other words, the sufficient conditions to have a global crisis are
c1 > b(γ + ) →A bankrupt, (3.8)
z(c1 − q¯A) > b(γ) →Spillover from A exceeds buffer in D, (3.9)
where
qA ≤ q¯A = y + rx+ zc1
1 + z
. (3.10)
To see that the conditions are sufficient, assume that (3.8) and (3.9) both
hold. Then A is bankrupt, and D’s deposit in A has lost value. In order to
avoid bankruptcy, D must be able to meet the demand for liquidity without
exceeding the buffer for liquidation of long-term assets. On the demand side
D faces demand γc1 from consumers and zc1 from region C. The available
liquidity is y from the short-term asset, zqA from the bank deposit in region
A and b(γ) from liquidating as much of the long-term asset possible without
causing late consumers to withdraw early. Thus the following condition must
be satisfied for the bank to avoid bankruptcy:
(γ + z)c1 ≤ y + b(γ) + zqA
≤ y + b(γ) + zq¯A.
We know from the original optimization problem that y = γc1 is a binding
constraint, and therefore holds with equality. From this it follows that the
condition to avoid bankruptcy can be rewritten
z(c1 − q¯A) ≤ b(γ).
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We have already assumed (3.9), and the condition to avoid bankruptcy con-
tradicts our assumption, thus D must be bankrupt.
Since regions are identical we have that qD ≤ q¯A < c1, that is the spillover
effect from D to C is at least as large as the spillover effect from A to D.
The argument from above can be repeated to show that region C must be
bankrupt. When C is bankrupt, the spillover from C will cause bankruptcy
in B, and the crisis that initially started in region A has spread contagiously
to the whole economy.
Complete graph
The analysis of the complete graph shows the importance of the market
structure in spread of a bank crisis. We have found two conditions (3.8)
and (3.9) that are sufficient to guarantee a global crisis for the directed cycle
if state σ¯ occurs. It turns out that we can find parameter values that will
result in contagion for directed cycle, but where the complete market is able
to absorb the shocks, such that there is an equilibrium that does not involve
bank runs.
We have already seen that for the complete graph analyzed in [2] a bank
holds (ωH − γ)/2 deposits in each adjacent region, that is the claims on each
region are smaller, but the total claim held in other regions is higher. We
then consider what happens in state σ¯. By following the same steps as for
the directed cycle, we get the following two sufficient criteria for a crisis to
be global:
c1 > b(γ + ) →Bankruptcy in A. (3.11)
z
2
(c1 − q¯A) > b(γ) →Spillover exceeds buffer in B,C,D, (3.12)
where
qA ≤ q¯A = y + rx+ 3zc1/2
1 + 3z/2
. (3.13)
For the same parameter values r, R, ωH , ωL we observe that the following
holds
z/2
(
c1 − y + rx+ 3zc1/2
1 + 3z/2
)
< z
(
c1 − y + rx+ zc1
1 + z
)
.
It is therefore possible to find a set of parameters, such that condition (3.8)
and (3.9) hold, but condition (3.12) is violated. We can thus conclude that
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the complete market has a better ability than the directed cycle to absorb
liquidity shocks and is thus a more robust market structure. The fact that the
complete market is more robust can be explained by the fact that each bank
is insured against liquidity shocks via several other regions, so the financial
interdependencies between regions is smaller.
The main take-away from Allen and Gale is that even small regional per-
turbations in demand for liquidity can have huge implications for the whole
economy. They explain the spread of financial crisis in an interbank deposit
market by spillover effects as bankrupt banks’ assets lose value. A key fea-
ture with their model, is that it points to inherent qualities in the financial
market as part of the problem. They also conclude that the complete market
is the most robust market structure, and that it generally seems that the
more connected the market is the more robust.
3.4 Robustness
The graphs analyzed by Allen and Gale are symmetric. Given that a liquidity
shock causes bankruptcy in one region, and that the spillover effect from the
bankrupt region to adjacent regions exceeds the buffer, we have a unique
symmetric equilibrium where all depositors liquidate their deposits and all
banks in all regions face bankruptcy. Robustness will in such cases be defined
by the size of the set of parameters that lead to contagion. As soon as we
introduce asymmetric graph structures and allow for different sized deposits
between banks, regional differences arise, and this complicates the robustness
analysis: a) The spread of a crisis can depend critically in which region the
initial liquidity shock occurs, and b) a crisis may spread to a nonempty proper
subset of the nodes V ′ ⊂ V but not to the whole economy. It is therefore
not clear how robustness should be defined.
There is some literature on robustness of networks, but few papers focus
on financial networks. In the literature robustness is often associated with
connectivity properties of the graph, in particular node connectivity. [7] gives
an example from communication networks, where the optimal robustness
properties are related to optimal connectivity and node similarity.
An interesting contribution to the robustness of financial networks is made in
[13], where they are characterized as robust yet fragile. The main idea is that
financial networks are robust in the sense that the probability of contagion
is low; the network has the ability to absorb fairly large shocks. At the same
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time, if problems occur and the absorption capacity is exceeded, such that a
crisis starts spreading, the effect can be extremely large.
Another feature of networks mentioned in the literature, is that networks
might be resilient to one type of attack, but not to another. A network
that displays robustness towards random attacks, where targeted nodes are
chosen at uniform, can at the same time be very vulnerable to a targeted
attack on certain key nodes in the network. For an example, see [21].
In this thesis we have chosen to analyze optimal and worst-case situations. In
both cases, we have been able to describe the robustness properties in terms
of parameter values and the set of bankrupt nodes. For a general analysis, it
would be useful with a more precise description of robustness. This is beyond
the scope of this thesis, but would be an interesting question to look into for
further studies of the Allen and Gale model.
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Chapter4
Framework for robustness analyses
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze robustness properties of different
market structures represented by graphs. The analyses will be within the
model proposed by Allen and Gale and introduced in the previous chapter.
In the model, banks in different regions are connected through an interbank
market of deposits. Banks hold deposits in other regions to insure themselves
against uncertainty of demand for liquidity at subsequent time steps. A
financial crisis can spread since interbank deposits lose value if a bank goes
bankrupt. To analyze robustness of a market structure represented by a
graph, we need to consider two steps:
1. Find transfers between banks at t = 0 such that the first-best solution
can be implemented.
2. Given the transfers, consider the effect of an initial bankruptcy in a
region on the rest of the economy.
The first part is important, since larger transfers between banks mean greater
financial interdependency, and the effect of a crisis in a region is more likely
to effect other regions.
For the analyses, it is useful to formulate the problem in a mathematical
framework.
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4.1 Notation
The interbank market is represented by the undirected graph G = (V,E).
Every region is uniquely represented by a vertex v ∈ V , and there are n = |V |
vertices. We say that region u is connected to region v if banks in region u
can hold deposits in region v and vice versa. This connection is represented
by the edge e = uv. The edge set E represents all interbank connections in
a market. Only the position in the network gives rise to differences between
regions, so the graph G is unlabeled and represents the equivalence class of
isomorphic graphs.
There are two disjoint types of regions in the model. The node set V is thus
partitioned into two disjoint subsets, VH and VL such that V = VH ∪ VL.
The subset of nodes VH represents regions with a higher share, ωH , of early
consumers, and the subset VL are regions with a lower share, ωL, of early
consumers, where 0 < ωL < ωH < 1. It is assumed that the number of early
consumer regions equals the number of late consumer regions, so we have
|VH | = |VL| = n/2.
A region v can be connected to early and late consumer regions. In the graph,
these are the neighbors NG(v) of v. We define the set of early consumer nodes
in the neighborhood to be
NHG (v) = {u : u ∈ NG(v), u ∈ VH},
and similarly for late consumer nodes
NLG(v) = {u : u ∈ NG(v), u ∈ VL}.
The number of neigbors is given by the degree of v, denoted by d(v), and the
number of early and late consumer regions in the neighborhood are dH(v) and
dL(v) respectively. We are often interested in the set of edges that connect
the two partitions of nodes. Since VL = V \VH the boundary is the set of
edges between the two subsets ∂(VL) = ∂(VH). The number of edges between
the subsets is |∂(VH)|. For shorthand we sometimes use vH for a node v ∈ VH
and vL for a node v ∈ VL.
Depending on the graph structure and the state of the world, the number of
edges through the boundary between VH and VL may differ. Since there is a
need to transfer liquidity between the different types, it is useful to have a
measure of the extent to which different node types are connected. We will
talk about correlation between node types, where high degree of correlation
means that most edges connect nodes that belong to the same node type,
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whereas low degree of correlation is when there are few edges between nodes
of same type. To capture this property of a graph, we define the correlation
coefficient. We use the simplest and most intuitive approach and define the
coefficient as the number of edges that connect nodes of same type divided
by the total number of edges.
Definition 4.1. Given a graph G = (V,E) with two disjoint partitions, VH
and VL, we define the correlation coefficient:
Cor(G) = 1− |{e ∈ E|e = uv, u ∈ VH , v ∈ VL}||E| = 1−
|∂(VH)|
|E| . (4.1)
We observe that Cor(G) = 0 for bipartite graphs with partitions VH and VL.
Furthermore, for connected graphs Cor(G) is strictly less than 1.
We denote average demand γ = (ωH + ωL)/2 and the difference between
average demand and actual demand z = ωH − γ = γ − ωL. Let δ(v) denote
demand for liquidity in region v. If δ(v) > 0 there is surplus of liquidity in v
and if δ(v) < 0 there is a liquidity deficit.
Banks hold deposits in other banks to implement the first-best solution. Since
deposits have orientation, it is useful to consider the associated directed graph
of G, D(G) with nodeset V and arcset A. Since D(G) is defined from an
undirected graph, the set of neighbors in the underlying graph equals the set
of in-neighbors equals the set of out-neighbors: ND(v) = N
+
D (v) = N
−
D (v) for
all v ∈ V .
To D(G) we define a function w : A→ R, such that a deposit from banks in
region u to banks in region v is represented by w(uv). A feasibility constraint
in the economic model is that the sum of the deposits a bank holds in banks
in other regions equals the sum of deposits banks in other regions hold in the
bank. Recall that we define w+(v) := w(∂+(v)) =
∑
a∈∂+(v)w(a). We have
w+(v) = w−(v) for all v ∈ V.
We say w is a circulation in D(G). The problem of finding a function w such
that the first-best optimum can be achieved, will be called the circulation
problem.
The motivation for interbank deposits is to be able to meet demand for
liquidity at subsequent time steps. The circulation problem will be more
precisely defined and we will see how it can be solved in later sections.
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4.2 Minimum flow distribution problem
At t = 1 and t = 2, the banks in a region face either a liquidity surplus or a
liquidity deficit, and there is need to transfer liquidity between regions. The
problem of redistributing liquidity in the network at these time steps, can
be formulated as a network flow problem. Since the problem is to transfer
liquidity from a set of sources, nodes with a surplus z of liquidity, to a set of
sinks, nodes with a deficit of z, the problem is a multiple sinks and sources
problem.
Let D(G) be the associated directed graph of G. We define the network
N := N(X, Y ) as the digraph D and two particular sets of vertices; a set of
sources X, and a set of sinks Y , where X, Y ⊂ V . There are no capacity
constraints on the arcs, that is c(a) = ∞ for all a ∈ A. Let f : A → R be a
flow function. If f satisfies the following constraints, we say that f is feasible
f+(v)− f−(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V \(X ∪ Y ), (4.2)
f+(x)− f−(x) = z for all x ∈ X, (4.3)
f+(y)− f−(y) = −z for all y ∈ Y, (4.4)
0 ≤ f(a) ≤ c(a) for all a ∈ A. (4.5)
In the problem we analyze, we have V \(X ∪ Y ) = ∅, that is all nodes are
either sources or sinks. The two constraints 4.2 and 4.5 are trivially satisfied,
and will be omitted for the rest of the thesis.
The family of feasible flows f is denoted F . We are interested in finding a
feasible f such that the total flow
∑
a∈A f(a) is minimized.
minimize
F
∑
a∈A
f(a). (4.6)
We call this problem the minimum flow distribution problem.
In our model, the central planner faces a minimum flow distribution problem
at both t = 1 and t = 2. Let N1 := N(X = VL, Y = VH) be the network
with the underlying digraph D(G) at t = 1 and let f be the solution to the
associated minimum flow distribution problem. Similarly, let N2 := N(X =
VH , Y = VL) be the network at t = 2 with the same underlying digraph D(G),
and let g be the solution to the minimum flow distribution problem in this
network. When D(G) is the digraph associated with the undirected graph G,
we also say that the minimum flow distribution problem is associated with
G.
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4.3 First-best allocation
The market is represented by an undirected graph. The first step of the
analysis is to find for what graph families it is possible to achieve the first-
best allocation. In other words we need conditions to ensure that the problem
of distributing liquidity at t = 1 and t = 2 can be solved. We have seen that
the problem can be formulated as the minimum flow distribution problem.
We can therefore find conditions under which the problem can be solved.
Theorem 4.1. Let G = (V,E) be the undirected graph representing the mar-
ket. The minimum flow distribution problem can be solved for a network
N(X, Y ) with the underlying digraph D(G) associated to G if and only if for
any connected component C in D, we have that |X(C)| = |Y (C)|, that is the
number of sinks and sources are the same.
Proof. Let C = (V (C), E(C)) be a connected component of D(G). Assume
without loss of generality that |X(C)| > |Y (C)|. Since C is a connected
component, we must have f+(V (C)) = f−(V (C)) = 0, there is no flow in or
out of the component. It follows that the total inflow to nodes must equal
the total outflow from nodes.∑
x∈X(C)
f+(x) +
∑
y∈Y (C)
f+(y) =
∑
x∈X(C)
f−(x) +
∑
y∈Y (C)
f−(y),
∑
x∈X(C)
f+(x)−
∑
x∈X(C)
f−(x) =
∑
y∈Y (C)
f−(y)−
∑
y∈Y (C)
f+(y),
∑
x∈X(C)
(
f+(x)− f−(x)) = ∑
y∈Y (C)
(
f−(y)− f+(y)),
z|X(C)| = z|Y (C)|.
This contradicts the assumption that |X(C)| > |Y (C)|. We can conclude
that |X(C)| = |Y (C)| must hold for every connected component for the
problem to have a solution.
The other implication can be shown by induction on nodes. Assume that
C is a connected component with two nodes, and |X(C)| = |Y (C)|. Let a
be the arc with head in Y and tail in X. Then f(a) = z and f(−a) = −z
is a feasible flow. Assume that we can find a feasible flow for a connected
component C with n nodes and |X(C)| = |Y (C)| = n/2. We can then show
that we can find a feasible flow for a connected component with n+ 2 nodes,
and the induction hypothesis holds. The details are omitted.
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From now on we will assume that all the graphs G we consider are connected.
The next step of the analysis is to find deposits between banks such that the
first-best solution can be achieved, that is to find the circulation w associated
to the graph D(G).
We show that we can find w by solving the minimal flow distribution problem
(4.6) at t = 1 with X = VL and Y = VH .
Proposition 4.2. Let G = (V,E) be the undirected graph representing the
market, and D(G) the associated digraph. Let f be the solution of the mini-
mum flow distribution problem in the network N1. We can then find functions
w and g where w is a solution to the circulation problem and g a solution
to the minimum flow distribution problem on N2, such that the following
identities hold
1. w(a) = f(−a) + g(−a).
2. f(a) = g(−a).
3. w(a) = f(a) + f(−a).
4. w(a) = w(−a).
Proof.
(1) This follows from the economic model, since w represents bank deposits
at t = 0. Let a = uv. Then f(−a) and g(−a) represent bank u withdrawals
from region v at t = 1 and t = 2 respectively. For the withdrawals to be
economically feasible, bank u cannot withdraw more than it has deposed
w(a) in region v, so we must have
w(a) ≤ f(−a) + g(−a).
In the model banks by definition withdraw all remaining deposits at t = 2,
and w(a) ≤ f(−a) + g(−a) must hold with equality.
(2) We can easily show that f(a) = g(−a) solves the flow distribution prob-
lem at t = 2. We check that each of the constraints is satisfied. Since X = VH
and Y = VL at t = 2 we have
g+(vH)− g−(vH) = −f+(vH) + f−(vH) = −(−z) = z,
and
g+(vL)− g−(vL) = −f+(vL) + f−(vL) = −z.
47 CHAPTER 4. FRAMEWORK FOR ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES
Since vH ∈ X and vL ∈ Y , both constraints are satisfied. Let h be any flow
that satisfies the feasibility constraints (4.3) and (4.4). Since f is a minimum
solution we have ∑
a∈A
g(−a) =
∑
a∈A
f(a) ≤
∑
a∈A
h(a),
and we have shown that f(a) = g(−a) solves the minimum flow distribution
problem at t = 2.
(3) follows directly from (1) on (2): w(a) = f(−a) + g(−a) = f(a) + f(−a).
(4) follows from (3): w(a) = f(a) + f(−a) = f(−a) + f(a) = w(−a).
The result has two important implications: For any undirected graph we can
find a function w of optimal transfers at t = 0 such that w(a) = w(−a) and
w+(v) =
∑
a∈∂+(v)
w(a) =
∑
a∈∂+(v)
w(−a) =
∑
a∈∂−(v)
w(a) = w−(v),
which shows that w is a circulation. In economic terms this means that in
our model, two adjacent banks always place equally sized deposits in each
other. Furthermore we can conclude that in order to find a solution w to
the circulation problem at t = 0, we can restrict the analyses to finding a
solution f to the minimum flow distribution problem at t = 1.
4.4 Spread of crisis
The second part of the analysis is to consider the situation when a region in
the market is bankrupt. This can also be formulated as a graph theoretic
problem. Since we start with a node in the graph G = (V,E) and consider
potential spread of a crisis from the node, a breadth first search approach
seems natural. The spillover effect from a bankrupt node to another node is
directed, hence we will work with the digraph D(G) associated with G.
The market is represented by the digraph D(G) and the spillover effect be-
tween regions is represented by a cost function C : A → R associated with
each arc. There is a constant capacity function c associated with the node
set of the graphs, such that all nodes v ∈ V have a capacity c(v) = c, which
represents a region’s buffer.
We choose an initial node v in the graph D(G). Node v is removed from
the graph (i.e. node is bankrupt). When a node v is removed, it induces a
flow, the spillover effect, from v to the neighbors u ∈ ND(v). The cost of
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the flow is given by C. If the cost of the flow exceeds the capacity of node
u, the node is removed from the graph. Starting from the initial node v, we
can traverse the graph with a breadth first search until no more nodes are
removed or the graph is empty. The set of removed nodes B corresponds
to the set of bankrupt regions. If B = V , the initial crisis has spread to all
regions. If |B| = 1, that is if it contains only the initial node, the initial
regional crisis has not spread at all. The breadth-first search through the
graph is presented in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Contagion BFS
Input: Start node v, digraph D, cost C, capacity c
Output: Subset B of nodes V in D
Set V = {v}
while V 6= ∅ do
Choose v from V
Add v to B
for u ∈ ND(v) but not in B do
if C(vu) > c then
Add u to V
end if
end for
Remove v from V
end while
Roughly speaking, a graph is considered robust if the set of removed nodes
B returned by algorithm 1, is small relative to the full nodeset V .
By considering the algorithm, we see that the size of B depends on the
criterion C(vu) > c. If we can show that the criterion is satisfied for all arcs
a = vu, we have maximum spread, that is B = V , and if we can show that
it is violated for all arcs a = vu, then |B| = 1.
The flow cost C(a) of an arc a = uv is defined to be the spillover effect from
region u to region v
C(a) = w(a) (c1 − qu) , (4.7)
where w(a) = f(a) + f(−a), f is the solution to the minimum flow distribu-
tion problem 4.6 and c1 is the return of a bank deposit at t = 1. The unit
value of a bank’s assets qu is defined by
qu =
y + rx+
∑
v∈NG(u)w(uv)qv
1 +
∑
v∈NG(u)w(uv)
.
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The capacity c is defined as the buffer b(γ) and is constant for all a ∈ A.
Since the main interest is to analyze the effect of the graph structure on
robustness, the economic parameters in the model, λ = (ωH , ωL, r, R) will be
seen as given, and we will investigate the robustness properties given a set
of parameters.
For general graphs we cannot solve the algorithm analytically. It is however
possible to derive certain properties of solutions for some graphs by looking at
the edge cost structure, which depends on the solution of the multiple source
and sink problem, the graph structure, and the economic input parameters
in the model.
Redundant edges
Let w be the solution to the circulation problem for an underlying digraph
D(G). Consider the arc a = uv in A(D(G)). If w(a) = w(−a) = 0, we say
that the edge e = uv in the edgeset of the associated graph G is redundant
in achieving the optimal solution.
The case of redundant edges raises important questions. By using the re-
dundant edges, that is assigning a positive value to w(a) for all a in A, we
can obtain a market more resilient towards regional liquidity shocks than we
do if we leave the redundant edges out. At the same time, we assume that a
central planner seeks to minimize the sum of all deposits banks in different
regions hold on each other.
In Allen and Gale, all w(a) are set to the maximum single edge flow, maxa∈A f(a),
so also redundant edges are assumed to be used for interbank deposits. The
approach in this thesis, where we allow for deposits of different sizes, gives
stronger robustness results.
The way we have chosen to treat the problem, is that we discuss properties of
the circulation problem and the minimum flow distribution problem without
regard to whether all edges in the underlying graph are used or not. For
the graphs we have considered, the maximum correlation linear graph, the
star, and the k-regular bipartite graph have no redundant edges. The other
graphs analyzed have redundant edges.
When we analyze the BFS-algorithm and the cost function C, we assume
that all edges have positive flow. For an arc a = uv we define the set of arcs
A(a) := ∂+({u, v}). We then define
wˆ(a) = min{w(b) | b ∈ A(a), w(b) > 0}.
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For a = uv such that w(a) = 0, we set
C(a) = wˆ(a) (c1 − qu) .
In words, for redundant edges in the graph that represents the market struc-
ture, the arcs with the same ends in the associated digraph are assigned
the minimum positive single value on an arc incident with any of the two
nodes connected by the redundant edge. This assumption does not affect
the robustness results derived theoretically, as the graphs analyzed have no
redundant edges. It is, however, important for simulation.
There are two pragmatic reasons for assigning a positive value to redundant
edges. First of all, if we do not use all edges, the network we analyze can
end up consisting of several connected components, although the underlying
graph that we wanted to analyze is connected. The other reason is that using
all edges increases robustness.
The economic rationale behind this assumption can be discussed, and there
are many aspects, such as the potential cost of connections, that could alter
the logic. Many of the central results we present are independent of this
assumption, and there has not been room for a more detailed discussion and
analysis of this problem within the frames of this thesis.
Chapter5
Robustness of graph families
In this chapter, we consider robustness properties of graphs with a fixed
number of vertices and edges. In particular, we look at two graph families:
Trees, and graphs on nk/2 edges where k is a positive integer. The two
most important results derived in the chapter are: a) The linear graph with
maximum correlation between edges is the least robust network structure,
and b) the k-regular bipartite is, in some sense, the most robust network
with nk/2 edges.
To analyze the robustness properties, we will look to the breadth-first search
in algorithm 1 and in particular the criterion C(a) > c. For a = uv, the
economic interpretation of the condition is that the spillover effect from a
bankruptcy in u exceeds the buffer in region v. The condition will be called
the cost-capacity condition. The cost function C depends strongly on the
minimum flow distribution problem, and it will be useful to derive certain
properties of the solution w of the circulation problem. Since w depends
only on the solution f of the minimum flow distribution problem, most of
the analysis will focus on properties of f . For the rest of this chapter, f is
the solution to the minimum flow distribution problem at t = 1 with the two
nodesets X = VL and Y = VH and the underlying graph G = (V,E).
It turns out to be useful to find bounds on the flow f in the graph, since
graphs that attain the bounds can be expected to have extremal robustness
properties. The robustness results derived in this chapter mostly follow the
following procedure:
1. Find upper and lower bounds on total flow, maximum and minimum
single edge flow by considering the minimum flow distribution problem.
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2. Show that the bounds are attained in the minimum flow distribution
problem for certain associated graphs.
3. Use the cost-capacity condition to show robustness results for these
graphs.
5.1 Properties of the flow f
In order to be able to derive the results we are interested in for w, we need to
establish certain properties of the solution f to the minimum flow distribution
problem.
First we observe that since the underlying digraph in the network is asso-
ciated to an undirected graph, we by definition have that a ∈ A implies
−a ∈ A for D(G) = (V,A).
Lemma 5.1. Let f be a solution to the minimum flow distribution problem,
and let a ∈ A be an arc in D(G). Then the following must hold for all a:
f(a) > 0⇒ f(−a) = 0. (5.1)
If there is positive flow along an arc in one direction, there is zero flow along
the arc in the opposite direction.
Proof. Since f solves the problem 4.6, the feasibility constraints 4.3 and 4.4
are satisfied. Let b ∈ A(D) be the arc from u to v. Denote by ∆f(b)
the difference ∆f(b) = f(b) − f(−b). Let A′ = A\({b,−b}) be the arcset
without b and −b. Assume without loss of generality that f(b) > f(−b). The
constraints for u are
∣∣f+(u)− f−(u)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a1∈∂+A (u)
f(a1)−
∑
a2∈∂−A (u)
f(a2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈∂+A (u)
(f(a)− f(−a))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈∂+
A′ (u)
(f(a)− f(−a))
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ∆f(b) = z.
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This shows that the constraint will be satisfied for any individual values f(b)
and f(−b) as long as ∆f(b) is constant. We can repeat the exact same
argument for node v to get that only the difference ∆f(b) matters. Since
f(a) is non-negative for all a ∈ A and f is the minimum∑
a∈A
f(a) = f(b) + f(−b) +
∑
a∈A′
f(a),
we see that the minimum that can be achieved such that the feasibility con-
straints are still satisfied is when ∆f(b) = f(b), which implies f(−b) = 0.
Lemma 5.2. Consider the minimum flow distribution problem on the net-
work N(X, Y ). If a = xy where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , we have
f(−a) = 0.
In other words, there is never positive flow on an arc from a source to a sink.
Proof. We know that at least one of f(a) and f(−a) equals 0. Assume
without loss of generality that the net flow through all other edges than a is
0 for both x and y. From the constraints from both x and y we obtain
f(a)− f(−a) = z.
Since f(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A we can conclude that f(−a) = 0.
Lemma 5.3. The flow f+(X) out of X equals the flow f−(Y ) in to Y . More
specifically,
f+(X) = f−(Y ) =
nz
2
.
Proof. From conservation of flow we have that for any V ′ ⊆ V the following
holds (see [3]) ∑
v∈V ′
(f+(v)− f−(v)) = f+(V ′)− f−(V ′).
Since x ∈ X in our problem satisfies
f+(x)− f−(x) = z.
We get directly that
f+(X)− f−(X) = z|X| = zn
2
.
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Furthermore, from conservation of flow on the whole network N we have that
f+(X)− f−(X) = f−(Y )− f+(Y ) = zn
2
.
There is no positive flow from Y to X, and we can conclude that
f−(X) = f+(Y ) = 0,
and we get
f+(X) = f−(Y ) =
zn
2
.
We can then find an upper bound on the total outflow and inflow to a node
Lemma 5.4. If f is a solution to the minimum flow distribution problem
and v a node in the network, we have
f+(v) ≤ zn
2
,
f−(v) ≤ zn
2
.
Proof. The result follow directly from the fact that the sum of net inflow to
all nodes in a subset equals the net inflow of the subset. Let X be the set of
all sources. We know that for any set V ′ ⊂ V the following holds:
f+(V ′) ≤ f+(X) = zn
2
.
Assume v ∈ X. Then the maximum possible inflow is f−(v) = f+(X\x) =
zn
2
− z. We have f+(v)− f−(v) = z. We get
f+(v) = z + f−(v) ≤ z + zn
2
− z = zn
2
.
5.2 Properties of the circulation w
We will now consider properties of the solution w of the circulation problem.
From Lemma 4.2 we know that w(a) = f(a) + f(−a).
55 CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS OF GRAPH FAMILIES
Definition 5.1. The following properties of the solution to the circulation
problem are defined:
1. Minimum total flow is defined as Q =
∑
a∈Aw(a).
2. Maximum single edge flow is defined as wmax = maxa∈Aw(a).
3. Minimum single edge flow is defined as wmin = mina∈Aw(a).
4. Maximum local single edge flow is defined as wvmax = maxa∈∂+(v)w(a).
The motivation for finding bounds on total flow and single edge flow, is that
they are central for the robustness analyses later in this chapter: Total flow
affects the average case, that is the expected spillover effect from a randomly
chosen node. Single edge flow affects worst- and best-case choices of intial
nodes in the cost-capacity problem.
First we see that the minimum total flow Q is found directly from the mini-
mum flow distribution problem.
Lemma 5.5. Let f be a solution to the minimum flow distribution problem.
The total flow Q can be written as
Q = 2
∑
a∈A
f(a).
Proof. By using Lemma 4.2 we get
Q =
∑
a∈A
w(a)
=
∑
a∈A
(f(a) + f(−a))
=
∑
a∈A
f(a) +
∑
a∈A
f(−a)
= 2
∑
a∈A
f(a).
A lower bound (LB) on the minimum total flow Q can be found.
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Lemma 5.6. For any graph G = (V,E), the minimum total flow Q is
bounded below by zn.
Q ≥ zn. (5.2)
The lower bound is attained if and only if for a feasible f , the following holds
f−(x) = f+(y) = 0 for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y.
Proof. SinceQ = 2
∑
a∈A f(a), it suffices to find a lower bound on
∑
a∈A f(a).
The flow in the graph D(G) must be conserved, that is the sum of incoming
flow over all nodes must equal the sum of outgoing flow from all nodes. Since
the flow f(a) contributes to both outgoing and incoming flow, the following
must hold ∑
v∈V
(
f+(v) + f−(v)
)
= 2
∑
a∈A
f(a).
From feasibility constraints in the minimum flow distribution problem, we
can deduce the lower bound
Q = 2
∑
a∈A
f(a)
=
∑
v∈V
(
f+(v) + f−(v)
)
=
∑
x∈X
(
f+(x) + f−(x)
)
+
∑
y∈Y
(
f+(y) + f−(y)
)
≥
∑
x∈X
(
f+(x)− f−(x))+∑
y∈Y
(
f−(y)− f+(y))
= z|X|+ z|Y |
= z|V |
= zn.
We see directly from the calculation that this holds with equality if and only
if f−(x) = f+(y) = 0 for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
We can also find an upper bound on the minimum total flow in a graph.
Lemma 5.7. The minimum total flow Q in any graph G = (V,E) is bounded
above by
Q ≤ zn2/2. (5.3)
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Proof. We consider the minimum flow distribution problem. There is a cost
of 1 associated to sending z along an edge. Since we have n/2 sinks and
n/2 sources, we can solve the problem by considering n/2 separate single
sink and source problems, where the rest of the nodes are considered inter-
mediary nodes. This reduces to an all pairs shortest path problem. To find
an upper bound on the solution of the minimum flow distribution problem,
it is sufficient to find the worst-case all pairs shortest path solution for the
underlying graph G = (V,E). By induction we can show that the maximum
all pairs shortest path solution is n2/4 for n even. We first show that it holds
for n = 2. There is only one pair of nodes, and they are adjacent. This
gives a lower bound on the flow of z22/4 = z, and the induction hypothesis
holds for the base case. Assume that the longest shortest past for n nodes
is n2/4. Consider the graph with n+ 2 nodes. The longest possible distance
between two nodes in a graph on n+2 nodes is n+1. The maximum all pairs
shortest path for the remaining n nodes is n2/4 by the induction hypothesis.
The worst case all pairs shortest path on n+ 2 nodes is therefore
n+ 1 + n2/4 =
n2 + 4 + 4n
4
=
(n+ 2)2
4
,
and we have shown by induction that n2/4 is the worst-case all pairs shortest
path. From this we can conclude that an upper bound on
∑
a∈A f(a) must
be zn2/4. This gives us the bound on Q
Q = 2f(a) ≤ 2
(
zn2
4
)
=
zn2
2
.
Then we find a lower bound on the maximum local single edge flow from a
node.
Lemma 5.8. The largest single edge flow, wvmax from a node v of degree d(v)
is at least z/d(v).
wvmax ≥
z
d(v)
. (5.4)
Proof. Let f be the solution of the minimum flow distribution problem. We
know that for a node v the following must hold
|f+(v)− f−(v)| = z,
|
∑
a∈∂+(v)
f(a)−
∑
a∈∂−(v)
f(a)| = z.
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Without loss of generality, assume that
∑
a∈∂+(v) f(a) >
∑
a∈∂−(v) f(a). We
get ∑
a∈∂+(v)
f(a) ≥ z
Assume for contradiction f vmax < z/d(v)∑
a∈∂+(v)
f(a) ≤ f vmaxd(v) <
zd(v)
d(v)
= z.
This gives a contradiction, and hence f vmax ≥ z/d(v). Since w(a) = f(a) +
f(−a) and f(−a) = 0 if f(a) > 0, we conclude that
wvmax = f
v
max ≥
z
d(v)
.
There is a lower bound on the maximum single edge flow in the graph, wmax.
Lemma 5.9. The maximum single edge flow wmax is bounded below by
wmax ≥ nz
2|∂+(X)| .
Proof. Consider the minimum flow distribution problem. From Lemma 5.3
we know
f+(X) = f−(Y ) = z|X| = zn
2
,∑
a∈∂+(X)
f(a) =
zn
2
.
Since X are all sources, this is the largest possible outflow from any subset
of nodes in D(G) . Assume for contradiction fmax < nz/(2|∂+(X)|.∑
a∈∂+(X)
f(a) ≤ |∂+(X)|fmax < zn
2
,
which is a contradiction. We conclude that
fmax ≥ nz
2|∂+(X)| .
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Assume a is the arc for which f attains its maximal value fmax = f(a) > 0.
We get
wmax ≥ w(a) = f(a) + f(−a) = fmax ≥ nz
2∂(X)
.
Lemma 5.9 indicates how robustness is influenced by the correlation pattern
in a graph. The fewer edges in the boundary between X and Y , the fewer
edges through which flow can be distributed, which will give larger spillover
effects along the edges.
We can also find an upper bound on the total outflow w+(v) from a node v
Lemma 5.10. The total outflow w+(v) of a node v is bounded above by
w+(v) ≤ (n− 1)z. (5.5)
Proof. Let f be the solution to the minimum flow distribution problem. As-
sume without loss of generality that v ∈ Y . The upper bounds on inflow and
outflow to v are
f−(v) ≤ zn
2
,
f+(v) ≤ zn
2
.
The feasible flow f must satisfy the feasibility constraint
f−(v)− f+(v) = z,
which can be written
f+(v) = f−(v)− z.
If we consider f+(v) + f−(v) such that the constraint above is satisfied, we
get
f+(v) + f−(v) = f−(v)− z + f−(v)
≤ zn
2
− z + zn
2
= z(n− 1).
CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS OF GRAPH FAMILIES 60
We can use this to find a bound on the sum w+(v)
w+(v) =
∑
a∈∂+(v)
w(a)
=
∑
a∈∂+(v)
(f(a) + f(−a))
=
∑
a∈∂+(v)
f(a) +
∑
a∈∂−(v)
f(a)
= f+(v) + f−(v)
≤ z(n− 1).
5.3 Trees
The first graph family we will analyze is trees. Trees are minimally connected
graphs with n−1 edges. By removing any edge, we will disconnect the graph
in two connected components.
We will analyze the minimum flow distribution problem for an underlying
graph G that is a tree with partitions X = VL and Y = VH .
Our first result is a lower bound on the minimum single edge flow in a tree.
Lemma 5.11. If G = (V,E) is a tree with a finite number of nodes, and w
a solution to the circulation problem, then w(a) is an integer multiple of z
for all a in A, then
w(a) = k(a)z for all a ∈ A,
where k : A→ N0.
Proof. Consider a node v with neighbors NG(v), and the rooted tree repre-
sentation of G where v is the root and all neighbors are children. A neighbor
and all its descendants form a rooted subtree. If v has dG(v) neighbors, we
can form dG(v) subtrees. We denote by Tu the subtree of neighbor u ∈ NG(v).
We will now consider the minimum flow distribution problem on D(G). To
simplify notation, we will keep the above-mentioned definitions for the rooted
tree representation and the subtrees Tu but with the arc set from D(G) in-
stead of the edge set from G.
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For a neighbor u of v, let a be the arc a = uv. We know from the proof of
lemma 5.3, that the net flow from a subset of node is the sum of the net flow
for all nodes in the subset. Therefore, the net flow between u and v must
satisfy
f(a)− f(−a) = f(Tu),
since a and −a are the only arcs connecting Tu to the other nodes in D(G).
Assume that |X(Tu)| = k and |Y (Tu)| = l. We have
f(Tu) = (k − l)z.
If k > l we have f(a) = (k − l)z and f(−a) = 0, and if l > k we have
f(a) = 0 and f(−a) = (l − k)z. Since k and l are non-negative integers, we
can conclude that f(a) or f(−a) is a non-negative multiple of z. Since this
holds for an arbitrary choice of v, and any subtree Tu, we can conclude that
w(a) = f(a) + f(−a) = |k − l|z for all a ∈ A.
We will now consider two trees: a) the linear graph, and b) the star graph.
5.3.1 Linear graph
The linear graph is a tree with two vertices of degree 1 (terminal vertices) and
the rest of the vertices of degree 2. The robustness properties of the linear
graph are sensitive to the correlation pattern between the nodes. We will
show robustness results for the minimum and maximum correlation linear
graphs.
Minimum correlation linear graph
We consider the linear graph G = (V,E) with alternating node types, that
is the bipartite linear graph with bipartitions VH and VL.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 5.1: Minimum correlation linear graph
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Lemma 5.12. If G(V,E) is a tree on n nodes with the disjoint nodesets VH
and VL, and we can find a subset E
′ ⊂ E such that M = (V,E ′) is a perfect
bipartite matching, then for the associated digraph D(G), there is a subset
A′ ⊂ A such that we can find a circulation w for which w(a) = z for all
a ∈ A′ and w(a) = 0 for all other a. The total flow Q is Q = zn.
Proof. We know that for a tree w(a) ≥ z and in general that Q ≥ nz. If we
can find a w such that w(a) = z and Q = nz it must be an optimal solution.
Assume G with a perfect bipartite matching M = (V,E ′). Let D(M) be the
associated digraph with arcset A′. There are n nodes, hence the bipartite
matching has n/2 pairs. Consider the minimum flow distribution problem.
Let a = xy and −a = yx be the arcs between a pair in the bipartite matching
where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . The function f such that f(a) = z for all a ∈ A′
with the tail in X and f(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A′ with the tail in Y , and f(a) = 0
if a /∈ A′ satisfies the feasibility constraints. We can then find w(a)
w(a) =
{
f(a) + f(−a) = z ∀ a ∈ A′,
f(a) + f(−a) = 0 ∀ a ∈ A\A′.
Since |A′| = n, we get
Q =
∑
a∈A
f(a) = |A′|z = nz.
The result gives the circulation in the minimum correlation linear graph,
which is a tree with an underlying parfect bipartite matching.
Since the total flow attains the lower bound, and z is the smallest possible
positive value w(a) in a tree, this indicates that a linear graph with an under-
lying bipartite matching is the optimal linear graph in terms of robustness.
An important question follows from this result. In the solution, some of the
edges in the underlying graph are redundant. In fact, the bipartite matching
consists of n/2 connected components. With this set-up, an initial financial
crisis will never spread farther from the origin than the initial region’s neigh-
bor in the bipartite matching. For simulations, we have chosen to add flow
z to zero-flow edges to ensure that the system we analyze is connected.
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Maximum correlation
We will see that the worst-case and most fragile realization of a linear graph
is the graph with the maximum correlation coefficient. This is the linear
graph L = (V,E) where |∂(VH)| = |∂(VL)| = 1, in other words, there is only
one edge connecting the nodesets VH and VL.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 5.2: Maximum correlation linear graph
Assume L = (V,E) is the maximum correlation linear graph ordered from
left to right with nodes V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} where vi ∈ VL for i ≤ n/2 and
vi ∈ VH for n/2 < i ≤ n. We want to show that this realization is in some
sense the least robust tree graph. First we need to describe w for the network
with the underlying digraph D(L).
Lemma 5.13. If L is the maximum correlation linear graph, and w is the
solution to the circulation problem associated to L, we have
w(a) = w(−a) = iz for a = vivi+1 and a = vn−ivn−i+1,
where i ∈ [1, . . . , n/2].
Furthermore wmax = zn/2 and Q = zn
2/2.
Proof. Denote by Vi the set of nodes {vj ∈ V : 1 ≤ j ≤ i}. Let f be the
solution to the minimum flow distribution problem on the network with the
underlying digraph D(L). For a node vi we have
f+(v)− f−(v) = z = f(∂(Vi−1)) + f(∂(V \Vi−i))
Assume that 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2. Then, by the sum of the net flow of nodes in
the subset, we must have f+(Vi−1) = (i − 1)z. We can therefore conclude
that for a = vi−1vi we have f(a) = (i− 1)z. We also have ∂−(V \Vi−1) = iz,
and we can conclude that for a = vivi+1 we have f(a) = iz. It automatically
follows that f(−a) = 0. This gives the w(a) we wanted to show.
The maximum single edge flow follows directly from Lemma 5.9, since |∂(X)| =
1. The total flow Q is just the sum of w(a), which, from a short calculation
can be found to be∑
a∈A
w(a) = 2
∑
a∈A
f(a) = 2× (2(1 + 2 + . . .+ n/2− 1) + n/2) z = zn
2
2
CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS OF GRAPH FAMILIES 64
The next step is to show that both the maximum single edge flow and the
total flow are larger than or equal to the optimal transfers in any other tree.
Proposition 5.14. Let G = (V,E) be any tree and w a solution to the
circulation problem. The minimum maximum single edge flow wmax satisfies
wmax ≤ zn/2 with equality for the maximum correlation linear graph. The
total flow Q satisfies Q ≤ zn2/2 with equality if and only if G is the maximum
correlation linear graph.
Proof. That the equalities are satisfied for the maximum correlation graph
was shown in Lemma 5.13. That wmax ≤ zn/2 follows from Lemma 5.4. The
maximum single edge flow is attained for all graphs with ∂(VL) = 1. We
need to show that Q < zn2/2 for all other networks than the network with
an underlying maximum correlation linear graph. This follows trivially from
the fact that the largest possible sum of all pairs shortest paths between pairs
of nodes in a graph is n2/2, which can only be achieved for the maximum
correlation linear graph.
We have concluded that the maximum correlation linear graph is the only
graph for which the maximum possible minimum total flow and the max-
imum single edge flow value are achieved in the associated minimum flow
distribution problem. This implies that spillover effects are worse than for
any other graph both on average, and for best-case and worst-case choice of
intial node. We can show that the maximum correlation linear graph is in
some sense the worst possible graph in terms of robustness.
Theorem 5.15. Let G be an undirected connected graph G = (V,E) with n
nodes, and let L = (V ′, E ′ = be the maximum correlation linear graph with
n nodes. Let Bv(G) be the subset of V obtained from algorithm 1 with input
v,D(G), w(G) and λ. If
Bv(G) = V for all v ∈ V,
then
Bu(L) = V
′ for all u ∈ V ′.
In economic terms, if for a set of parameters λ and any v ∈ V we have that
bankruptcy in v will spread to all regions in G, the same set of parameters
ensure full contagion in L given bankruptcy in any node u in V ′.
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Proof. Recall that C(a) = w(a)(c1 − qu). From algorithm 1 we see that if
C(a) > c holds for all a ∈ A(G), we must show that it holds for all a ∈ A(L).
Define
Cmin(G) = min
a∈A(G)
C(a),
Cmin(L) = min
a∈A(L)
C(a).
A sufficient and necessary condition to ensure Bv(G) = V for all v in V is
Cmin(G) > c,
and a sufficient condition to ensure that Bu(L) = V
′ for all u in V ′ if Bv(G) =
V holds for all v in V is thus
Cmin(L) ≥ Cmin(G). (5.6)
If we can find an upper bound on Cmin(G), and show that Cmin(L) is greater
than or equal the upper bound, the theorem will be proved. In the minimum
flow distribution problem, there is at at least one source x ∈ X such that
f−(x) = 0 and f+(x) = z. Therefore, the maximum minimum value possible
w(a) is z. The other property we use is that for C(a) is decreasing when the
sum w+(u) increases. We can find an upper bound on the Cmin(G)
Cmin(G) = min
a,G
w(a)
(
c1 − y + rx+ w
+(u)qu
1 + w+(u)
)
≤ z
(
c1 − y + rx+ zc1
1 + z
)
,
hence we need to show that
Cmin(L) ≥ z
(
c1 − y + rx+ zc1
1 + z
)
.
Observe that for the graph L, node positions i and n − i + 1 are identical
for i ∈ [1, n/2]. We have seen that w(a) = iz for both a = vivi+1 and
a = vn−ivn−i+1, and they also have the same degree d(vi) = d(vn−i+1). When
we analyse the function C(a), we will therefore consider nodes in positions
i ∈ [1, n/2].
A first step is to calculate qi for each node vi in the network with the under-
lying linear graph D(L). We have
qi =
y + rx+ (i− 1)qi−1z + iqi+1z
1 + (2i− 1)z . (∗)
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If region i is not bankrupt qi = c1, and if region i is bankrupt, qi < c1. We
can find an upper bound, q¯i, on qi by assuming qi−1 = qi+1 = c1. From (∗)
we get
qi ≤ q¯i = y + rx+ z + (2i− 1)zc1
1 + (2i− 1)z .
Let ai be the arc vivi+1. For a node vi consider the set of outgoing arcs
∂+(vi) = {ai,−ai−1}. From lemma 5.13 we can find C(ai) and C(−ai−1)
respectively
C(−ai−1) = (i− 1)z (c1 − qi) ,
C(ai) = iz (c1 − qi) .
We see that C(ai) > C(−ai−1).
We want to show
C(ai+1) > C(ai).
To simplify calculations, let k = 2i − 1 and l = 2i + 1 and observe that
k − l = −2 and l − k = 2.
C(ai+1)− C(ai) =
(i+ 1)z(c1 − qi+1)− iz(c1 − qi) =
1
z
(c1 − (i+ 1)qi+1 + iqi) =
1
z
(
c1 − (i+ 1)y + rx+ lzc1
1 + lz
+ i
y + rx+ kzc1
1 + kz
)
=
1
z(1 + lz)(1 + kz)
(c1 + c1z(2i− 1)− 2zc1i− y − rx) =
1
z(1 + lz)(1 + kz)
(c1 − y − rx− c1z + zy + zrx) =
1
z(1 + lz)(1 + kz)
((c1 − y − rx)(1− z)) .
From the economic model, we know that z = ωH−γ < 1 and y+rx < 1 < c1.
All the factors are positive, and we can conclude that
C(ai+1) > C(ai).
Let C¯(ai) be the upper bound
C¯(ai) = iz(c1 − q¯i) ≥ iz(c1 − qi) = C(ai).
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We want to show that
C(−ai+1) ≥ C¯(ai).
This is satisfied if the following holds
iz(c1 − qi+1)− iz(c1 − q¯i) ≥ 0,
which implies that we must have qi+1 ≤ q¯i. This is not trivial, and we need
to use additional structure of the problem.
We show qi+1 ≤ q¯i by induction on the number of nodes. First consider
n = 2. From symmetry of the problem, we have that q1 = q2 ≤ q¯1. Then
assume it holds for L on n nodes such that qi+1 ≤ q¯i ∀ i ∈ [1, n/2]. Consider
the linear graph on n + 2 nodes. First we observe that node n/2 + 1 and
n/2 + 2 are identical, so from symmetry we must have qn/2+1 = qn/2+2. Since
qn/2+1 =
y + rx+ (n/2)qn/2z + (n/2 + 1)qn/2+2z
1 + (n+ 1)z
,
qn/2+1 =
y + rx+ (n/2)qn/2z
1 + (n/2)z
,
≤ y + rx+ (n/2)zc1
1 + (n/2)z
≤ q¯n/2,
the induction hypothesis holds.
For D(L), we have that C(ai) < C(ai+1) and that C¯(ai) < C(−ai+1). We
observe that
Cmin(L) = C(a1)
= z
(
c1 − y + rx+ c1z
1 + z
)
≤ C(a) for all a ∈ A.
We then have what we need to conclude the proof:
Cmin(L) = z
(
c1 − y + rx+ c1z
1 + z
)
≥ Cmin(G).
In economic terms, we can conclude that for λ such that z
(
c1 − y+rx+c1z1+z
)
>
b(γ), all regions in L will go bankrupt regardless of where a crisis starts. This
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shows that the maximum correlation linear graph is in some sense the least
robust graph.
In the result shown above we have only considered the case of full spread
to all regions. The flow properties and degree structure of the maximum
correlation linear graph suggest that a more general result holds: For any
parameter value there are more nodes from which a crisis will spread, and
more regions that will be affected for the maximum correlation linear graph
than for any other graph. Establishing such a result seems to require a
different approach than what has been used in this thesis, and is therefore
left as an open question.
We have seen that the least robust tree structure is the maximum correlation
linear graph. We have also shown that a linear graph with an underlying
bipartite matching is more robust than any other linear graph. In terms of
robustness, however another tree structure does better.
5.3.2 The star
A star is a graph G on n nodes with n − 1 nodes of degree 1 and 1 node
of degree n − 1. The node set is as usual partitioned into two equally large
disjoint subsets VH and VL. The star graph has two particularly interesting
properties in our model: a) Any partition into two subsets VH and VL has the
exact same properties, and b) the center node’s shock absorbing qualities.
Lemma 5.16. If G is the star graph and D(G) the associated digraph, we
can find the optimal circulation w such that w(a) = z for all a ∈ A and
Q = 2(n− 1)z
Proof. Consider the minimum flow distribution problem on the network with
the digraph D(G). An arbitrary node in the graph can be in one of two
positions: leaf node vl or the center node vc. Assume v is a leaf node vl. A
leaf node has degree 1, with only one incoming and one outgoing arc. We
get
|f+(vl)− f−(vl)| = z,
|f(a)− f(−a)| = z.
This implies
f(a) + f(−a) = z,
w(a) = z.
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Figure 5.3: Star graph
Since w(a) = z holds for any a with an end in a terminal node, and all a
in the star graph has one end in a terminal node and one end in the center
node, we can conclude that
w(a) = z for all a ∈ A.
It is easy to see that the spillover effect from the center node in case of
bankruptcy is smaller than for any other node in any tree. The center node
has thus better shock-absorbing qualities than any other node.
Theorem 5.17. Let G = (V,E) be the star graph with center node vc and
let G′ = (V,E ′) be any connected tree. Let A(G) be the arcset of D(G) and
A(G′) the arcset of D(G′). Let ac ∈ A be any arc from the center node to a
leaf node a = vcvl. The flow C¯(ac) ≤ C¯(a) for any ac ∈ A and a ∈ A′.
Proof. Consider a = uv ∈ A′. The cost C(a) is bounded above by
C¯(a) = w(a) (c1 − q¯u)
We know that for any tree G′ we have w(a) ≥ z and that w+(u) ≤ (n− 1)z.
From Lemma 5.16 we know that for the star graph G we have w(a) = z and
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consequently w+(vc) = (n− 1)z. This gives
C¯(a) = wa (c1 − q¯u)
≥ z (c1 − q¯u)
= z
(
c1 − y + rx+ w
+(u)c1
1 + w+(u)
)
≥ z
(
c1 − y + rx+ (n− 1)zc1
1 + (n− 1)z
)
= z (c1 − q¯c)
= C¯(ac).
5.4 Graphs with nk/2 edges
We will now consider graphs with nk/2 edges, that is graphs with an average
degree k where k is a positive integer. The main result in this section is a
robustness result for the k-regular bipartite graph.
5.4.1 The k-regular bipartite graph
We will show that for n nodes and kn/2 edges, the bipartite k-regular graph
is the most robust graph structure.
The first step is to find the optimal circulation w for the k-regular bipartite
graph. It can be shown that the optimal transfers are z/k through all edges.
Lemma 5.18. Let G = (V,E) be the k-regular bipartite graph with biparti-
tions VH and VL. We can find a circulation w such that w(a) = z/k for all
a ∈ A. The total flow Q in the graph is Q = nz.
Proof. We first observe that the graph is symmetric, so we must have a
symmetric equilibrium such that f(a) is identical for all a ∈ A. Each node
v has outdegree and indegree k. We consider the minimum flow distribution
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Figure 5.4: 4-regular bipartite graph
problem. For a node v ∈ V we have that
|f+(v)− f−(v)| = z,
k|f(a)− f(−a)| = z,
k(f(a) + f(−a)) = z,
f(a) + f(−a) = z
k
,
w(a) =
z
k
,
which is the result we wanted to show. Summing over all edges we get
Q =
∑
a∈A
w(a) = nk × z
k
= nz.
We can then show that the following holds
Lemma 5.19. Let G = (V,E) is a graph with |V | = n and |E| = nk/2
and w the solution to the circulation problem for D(G), the following two
statements are equivalent:
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1. Maximum single edge flow is wmax = z/k.
2. G is the k-regular bipartite graph.
Proof. We have already shown in the previous lemma that the second implies
the first. What is left to prove is that the regular bipartite graph is the only
graph G where the lower bound for wmax is attained. Assume the graph G
is not regular. Since the average degree is k, there must be at least one node
v with degree d(v) < k. Then from Lemma 5.4 we get
wvmax ≥ z/d(v) > z/k.
Regularity is therefore necessary for wmax = z/k to hold. Assume G is regular
but not bipartite. Then there is at least one edge between nodes of same
type. Consequently, if we consider the minimum flow problem on D(G), we
observe
∂+(X) <
nk
2
.
By using Lemma 5.9 we get
wmax ≥ nz
2|∂+(X)| >
2nz
2nk
=
z
k
.
We can conclude that wmax = z/k if and only if G is the k-regular bipartite
graph.
The next step, is to show that we can find parameter values such that the
spillover effect causes bankruptcies for all graphs but the k-regular bipartite
graph. We can show that we can find parameter values such that it holds for
a non-empty subset of nodes.
Theorem 5.20. Let G = (V,E) be the k regular bipartite graph and G′ =
(V,E ′) graph with the same nodeset that is not the k-regular bipartite graph.
Then there exist parameter values λ = (r, R, ωH , ωL) such that |Bv(G)| = 1
for all v ∈ V , but |Bv(G′)| > 1 for a nonempty subset of nodes v ∈ V .
Proof. For G the condition to ensure |Bv(G)| = 1 is
C¯(a) = z
k
(c1 − q¯) = z
k
(
c1 − y + rx+ zc1
1 + z
)
≤ c. (5.7)
Let λ be the parameter values and G the k-regular graph such that
C¯(a) = c. (5.8)
73 CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS OF GRAPH FAMILIES
For G′ we have seen that wmax > z/k. Assume without loss of generality
that wmax = w(a) for a = uv. Consider C(a). Assume that u has degree
d(u). Then wmax ≥ z/d(u). This gives
wmax
(
c1 − y + rx+ w
+(u)c1
1 + w+(u)
)
≥
wmax
(
c1 − y + rx+ d(u)wmaxc1
1 + d(u)wmax
)
≥
wmax
(
c1 − y + rx+ zc1
1 + z
)
>
z
k
(
c1 − y + rx+ zc1
1 + z
)
.
From this we can conclude that along the edges with the largest transfer,
wmax, the spillover will exceed the buffer for any other graph except the k-
regular bipartite graph given that (5.8) holds. In fact this holds for all nodes
with incident edges with w > z/k.
This shows that the k-regular bipartite graph absorbs shocks better than
any other graph with nk/2 edges, both on average and in worst-case. We
may, however, still be able to find graphs G such that an initial bankruptcy
will cause full contagion in the k-regular bipartite graph, but where there
might be nodes v in G from which the spillover does not exceed the buffer
in adjacent regions.
5.4.2 The minimum correlation lattice
The minimum correlation lattice does generally not have extremal properties
like the k-regular bipartite graph. Since it can be seen as a generalization of
the complete market considered by Allen and Gale, it is of interest to derive
certain properties.
Definition 5.2. The k regular ring lattice is the graph G = (V,E) where, if
we label the edges V = (v0, v1, . . . , vn−1), there is an edge (vi, vj) if and only
if |i− j| ≡ k mod n for k ∈ [1, k/2].
The complete graph is thus a lattice with k = n− 1.
We then consider a lattice wher early and late consumer regions are organised
in alternating order. Let G = (V,E) be a k-regular ring lattice with nodes
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{v1, v2, . . . , vn}. We define the minimum correlation as the lattice where
vi ∈ VH for odd i and vi ∈ VL for even i. The number of neighbors each node
has of each node type is
dH(vH) = d
L(vL) = 2 bk/4c ,
dH(vL) = d
L(vH) = 2 (b(k − 1)/4c+ 1) .
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Figure 5.5: Minimum correlation 4-lattice
Lemma 5.21. Let G = (V,E) is the k-regular minimum correlation lattice.
We can then find a solution w to the circulation problem associated wtih
D(G) such that
w(a) =
z
dH(vL)
for a in ∂(VH),
w(a) = 0 for all other a in A.
Proof. Let f be a flow function associated with D(G). We have that
f(a) =
z
dH(vL)
for a in ∂+(X),
f(a) = 0 for all other a in A,
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where f a feasible flow that satisfies the minimum flow distribution problem
associated with D(G). That the flow is feasible follows directly from inser-
tion in to the feasibility constraints. That the flow is a minimum flow, and
therefore satisfies the minimum flow distribution problem follows by Lemma
5.2 ∑
a∈A
f(a) =
z
dH(vL)
|∂+(X)| = z
dH(vL)
× nd
H(vL)
2
=
zn
2
.
From Proposition 4.2 we know that w(a) = f(a) + f(−a), and we get the
result we want.
We see that the edges between nodes of the same type are redundant in
solving the minimum flow distribution problem for the k-lattice. In Allen
and Gale, the redundant edges in the complete graph, a special case of the
k-lattice with k = n−1, are assigned the same value as the other edges. This
is also done in numerical simulations in this thesis.
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Chapter6
Numerical examples
We have found robustness results for certain regular graph families. For most
graphs, however, it is impossible to solve the model analytically because of
the complexity of the problem. This motivates numerical simulations of the
model. We will illustrate the theoretical results from the previous chapter
through simulations for various parameter values and graph structures, and
we will compare the equilibrium solutions of different graphs with a fixed
number of edges.
6.1 Parameters and input values
In the model and with the assumptions presented in this thesis, the problem
is defined by the following exogeneous parameters: The economic parameters
λ = (r, R, ωH , ωL), where r and R are the liquidation values of a long-term
asset at t = 1 and t = 2 respectively, the network structure G, the node
correlation pattern σ, and the region of the initial shock v. We also need to
choose a utility function u that is monotone, concave and twice continously
differentiable.
In [8], Douglas W. Diamond analyzes a numerical example of the Diamond-
Dybvig model, that Allen and Gale’s model build on. Diamond’s choice of
utility function is u(c) = 1 − 1/c. This utility function will be used in all
numerical examples in this chapter.
The different parameters influence the problem in different ways. The pur-
pose of this thesis, and what we have discussed in previous chapters, is mainly
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to discuss how the network structure and correlation pattern influence the
robustness of the system. In order to simulate the problem, we need to decide
how to choose the other parameters involved.
The demand at t = 1 in high and low demand regions, ωH and ωL, is kept
fixed throughout all simulations. This could be any two values. In [8], the
demand ω in a region is 0.25, so a reasonable choice may be ωH = 0.35 and
ωL = 0.15. This gives γ = 0.25 and z = 0.1. For the return, R, of the
illiquid, long-term asset, we also follow Dybvig and choose R = 2.
For the choice of r, observe that r does not affect the first-best allocation
or the interbank deposit size. Since r represents the value of the illiquid
asset if prematurely liquidated, it only affects the outcome in the case of a
liquidity shock. The smaller r the bigger is the loss of value from premature
liquidation, which will affect the buffer and the spillover effect. Keeping all
other parameters fixed, we can use r to ”tune” the model such that we get
spread of crisis. The first step is to write the spillover condition as a function,
Φ, where Φ > 0 implies that the spillover exceeds the buffer:
Φ = w(uv)(c1 − q¯u)− b(γ). (6.1)
We can then substitute for q¯u and b(γ) to get
Φ = w(uv)
(
c1 − y + rx+
∑
w(uv)c1
1 +
∑
w(uv)
)
− r
(
x− (1− γ)c1
R
)
.
Take the partial derivative with respect to r
∂Φ
∂r
=
−w(uv)x
1 +
∑
w(uv)
−
(
x− (1− γ)c1
R
)
=
(1− γ)c1
R
− w(uv)x
1 +
∑
w(uv)
− x
=
Rxc1
Rc2
− w(uv)x
1 +
∑
w(uv)
− x
= x
c1
c2
− x− w(uv)x
1 +
∑
w(uv)
=
(
c1
c2
− 1
)
x− w(uv)x
1 +
∑
w(uv)
< 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that c2 > c1 and x > 0 and all
w(uv) non-negative. Thus we can conclude that there is a threshold such
that for r-values below the threshold, condition 2 will hold, and for r-values
above the threshold the condition will be violated. This threshold can easily
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be found as a function of the optimal contract, the node degree and the size
of the deposit, w(uv). The threshold is when Φ = 0, so a simple calculation
gives an explicit expression for the threshold:
rthreshold =
w(uv)c1 − w(uv)y+
∑
w(uv)c1
1+
∑
w(uv)
w(uv)x
1+
∑
w(uv)
+ x− (1−γ)c1
R
.
For a given set of input parameters and graph structure, we have that for
r > rthreshold the spillover effect from a region will not exceed the buffer of
another region given bankruptcy in the inital region. We denote by rmax
the maximum value for r for which an intitial bankruptcy might spread to a
nonempty nodeset, that is for rmax there is at least one node i and one node
j such that a bankruptcy in i will cause the spillover from i to j to exceed the
buffer and cause bankruptcy in j. On the other end of the scale, we denote
by rmin the maximum value for r such that the spillover is exceeded between
any two nodes (the maximum minimum value). A high rmin will indicate a
vulnerable graph structure, and a low value of rmax will indicate a robust
graph structure.
The optimal contract
The optimal contract is independent of the graph structure. Since the opti-
mal contract is affected only by the utility function u(·) and the parameters
ωH , ωL, R, we can find the first-best allocation that will be used for all sim-
ulations.
Solving the original optimization problem (3.1) and finding the first best
allocation is trivial, and implementation is straightforward using standard
Matlab functions.
From Chapter 3 we know that the optimal solution of the problem is the
solution of the following equation
γu′(c1)−Rγu′
(
R(1− γc1)
1− γ
)
= 0.
By inserting for the chosen parameter values and solving the equation numer-
ically, we find the following optimal allocation (x, y, c1, c2) for the parameters
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λ = (ωH , ωL, R) ωH = 0.35ωL = 0.15
R = 2
 ⇒

x = 0.68
y = 0.32
c1 = 1.28
c2 = 1.81
 . (6.2)
This means that for the given input parameters, the banks will invest 68% of
the portfolio in long term assets and 32% in short term assets. The returns
to consumers at t = 1 is 1.28 per unit and 1.81 per unit at t = 2.
Initial liquidity shock
Like before, we are interested in analyzing equilibrium in state σ¯. Further-
more we require the initial region to be bankrupt. In the model, the size
of the liquditidy shock  is exogenously given. To ensure bankruptcy we
choose a large  such that bankruptcy in the initial region always is ensured.
Given γ, r, R the minimum  that would cause bankruptcy in the region of
the initial shock can be calculated. Since we use r as a tuning parameter,
and the minimum  depends on r, which affects the buffer size, we use rmin to
calculate the minimum , and it will therefore vary with the graph structure.
Market structure
We will consider the same graph families that have been analyzed in the pre-
vious chapter, namely graphs on n−1 edges and nk/2 edges. All simulations
will be for n = 20. For graphs on n − 1 edges, simulations are done for the
maximum and minimum correlation linear graphs, the star and a random
tree. The structures with nk/2 edges that we simulate are the k-regular
bipartite graph, the k-lattice with maximum and minimum correlation, as
well as a random graph generated with the standard Watts and Strogatz
procedure with rewiring probability 1.
6.2 Trees
Trees are generally the most fragile connected graphs, since they are mini-
mally connected with less edges than any other connected graph. In this sec-
tion we present results from simulations as explained in the previous chapter.
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We will see resuls for the maximum and minimum correlation linear graphs,
the star, and a randomly generated tree. The results turn out to be coherent
with the theoretical results presented in the previous chapter.
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6.2.1 Maximum correlation linear graph
We first present the results from simulation for the maximum correlation
linear graph. From the previous chapter it is known to be the least robust
market structure, hence one can expect rmax and rmin to be larger than for
any other graph.
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Student Version of MATLAB
Maximum correlation linear graph
Diameter 19
Clustering coefficient 0
Correlation coefficient 0.947
Maximum transfer (×z) 10
Minimum transfer (×z) 1
Maximum degree 2
Minimum degree 1
Buffer size 0.059
Minimum  0.054
rmin 0.335
rmax 0.765
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6.2.2 Minimum correlation linear graph
The simulation confirm what is known from the previous chapter; that the
transfers are z along all edges, and that the end nodes are slightly more
vulnerable towards liquidity shocks than other nodes, since there is only one
adjacent node.
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Minimum correlation linear graph
Diameter 19
Clustering coefficient 0
Correlation coefficient 0
Maximum transfer (×z) 1
Minimum transfer (×z) 1
Maximum degree 2
Minimum degree 1
Buffer size 0.062
Minimum  0.058
rmin 0.313
rmax 0.335
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6.2.3 The star
The star graph is of interest mostly for the shock absorbing properties of the
center node, which in the simulation is reflected by the low rmin.
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Star graph
Diameter 2
Clustering coefficient 0
Correlation coefficient 0.47
Maximum transfer (×z) 1
Minimum transfer (×z) 1
Maximum degree 19
Minimum degree 1
Buffer size 0.030
Minimum  0.025
rmin 0.149
rmax 0.335
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6.2.4 Random tree
The random tree is included in the simulation to give an understanding of
the dynamics of the model. The tree was generated by starting with an
empty graph, and then until all nodes were connected, repeatedly choosing
two nodes at random and adding an edge between them if this did not create
a cycle.
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Random tree
Diameter 13
Clustering coefficient 0
Correlation coefficient 0.47
Maximum transfer (×z) 3
Minimum transfer (×z) 1
Maximum degree 19
Minimum degree 1
Buffer size 0.052
Minimum  0.047
rmin 0.26
rmax 0.57
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6.3 Graphs with nk/2 edges
In the simulation, we have considered graphs with 20 nodes and 40 edges. For
this family of graphs, the k-regular bipartite graph, is shown to be the most
robust. We also consider the minimum and maximum correlation k-lattice,
and a random graph.
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6.3.1 The 4-regular bipartite graph
Since the k-regular graph is the most robust graph with nk/2 edges, we
expect rmax to be lower than for all other graphs with the same number of
nodes and edges. This is coherent with the results from the simulations
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4-regular bipartite graph
Diameter 4
Clustering coefficient 0
Correlation coefficient 0
Maximum transfer (×z) 0.25
Minimum transfer (×z) 0.25
Maximum degree 4
Minimum degree 4
Buffer size 0.020
Minimum  0.017
rmin 0.102
rmax 0.102
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6.3.2 The minimum correlation lattice
This graph is included, since it can be seen as a generalization of the complete
graph analyzed by Allen and Gale. The results from the simulation reflects
the theoretical results from the previous chapter.
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Min.corr. 4-lattice
Diameter 5
Clustering coefficient 0.5
Correlation coefficient 0.5
Maximum transfer (×z) 0.5
Minimum transfer (×z) 0.5
Maximum degree 4
Minimum degree 4
Buffer size 0.035
Minimum  0.030
rmin 0.176
rmax 0.176
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6.3.3 The maximum correlation lattice
The maximum correlation lattice is included for comparison with the mini-
mum correlation lattice to illustrate the importance of the correlation pat-
terns. As we can see, rmax is higher than for the minimum correlation lattice.
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Max.corr. 4-lattice
Diameter 5
Clustering coefficient 0.5
Correlation coefficient 0.85
Maximum transfer (×z) 2.4
Minimum transfer (×z) 0.1
Maximum degree 4
Minimum degree 4
Buffer size 0.009
Minimum  0.007
rmin 0.043
rmax 0.522
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6.3.4 Random graph
The random graph is generated by applying the Watts-Strogatz procedure
with rewiring probability 1.
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Random graph
Diameter 4
Clustering coefficient 0.22
Correlation coefficient 0.42
Maximum transfer (×z) 1
Minimum transfer (×z) 1
Maximum degree 4
Minimum degree 4
Buffer size 0.047
Minimum  0.042
rmin 0.236
rmax 0.313
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6.4 Overview of graph structures
The numerical examples are coherent with the theoretical results from the
previous chapter. We have kept the parameters (R,ωH , ωL) fixed, and cal-
culated two r-values, an upper bound, rmin that guarantees full contagion
given (R,ωH , ωL) and an upper bound on rmax such that a crisis can spread
to a non-empty subset of nodes. The rmin gives an ordering of the graphs we
have considered, where larger rmin in some sense indicate a less robust market
structure. The smaller the difference between |rmax − rmin|, the more likely
is a crisis to reach the whole economy if it starts spreading. If rmax = rmin
spread to the whole economy is guaranteed if the spillover exceeds the buffer
in any region.
An overview of the results sorted from less robust to more robust (rmax in
descending order) is presented in table 6.1.
Graph type rmax rmin  No. of edges
Max.corr.lin.graph 0.765 0.335 0.054 19
Random tree 0.570 0.260 0.047 19
Max.corr.lattice 0.522 0.043 0.007 40
Min.corr.lin.graph 0.335 0.313 0.058 19
Star 0.335 0.149 0.025 19
Random graph 0.313 0.236 0.042 40
Min.corr.lattice 0.176 0.176 0.030 40
Regular bipartite graph 0.102 0.102 0.102 40
Table 6.1: Overview of graph structures
We see that the three most important results from the previous chapter are
supported by numerical calculations. The maximum correlation linear graph
has the highest rmin and rmax of the graphs tested. It is thus the least robust
by both measures. Furthermore we see that rmin is lower for the star than
for other trees. This comes from the shock absorbing properties of the center
node. For the regular bipartite graph, rmax is lower than for the rest of the
graphs. This reflects the property that the worst case in other graphs (with
the same number of edges) is worse than for this graph. The only somewhat
surprising result is that rmin is lower for the maximum correlation lattice
than for any other graph. The reason for this is that the solution of the
minimum flow distribution problem is not unique, and the solution found
by algorithm 1 is one where the transfers are unequally distributed between
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edges, and in that sense suboptimal. If we improved the algorithm such that
the solution chosen was one where flow was distributed as equally as possible
between edges, we would get a different and more realistic result. Since this
thesis has focused on theoretical analysis, and not on the algorithmic aspects
of the problem, this has not been given priority.
Chapter7
Concluding remarks
In this thesis the model presented by Allen and Gale has been analyzed
for different network structures. In [2], Allen and Gale conclude that com-
plete markets are more robust than incomplete markets. Furthermore they
suggest that the network structure of incomplete markets affects the robust-
ness properties of the market. Exploring the robustness properties of several
incomplete networks, this thesis confirms that the network structure plays
a crucial role in determining a markets ability to absorb regional liquidity
shocks.
7.1 Summary of main results
It has been argued that the robustness analysis of market structures can be
reduced to two mathematical problems: a flow minimization problem and
a breadth-first search algorithm. By considering properties of the mathe-
matical problems, we have been able to show properties of certain market
structures. The two most important results we have shown are
• The maximum correlation linear graph is the least robust market struc-
ture
• The k-regular bipartite graph is the most robust market structure with
nk/2 edges
The first result was derived by considering the minimum flow distribution
problem (4.6) for general graphs and deriving an upper bound on the to-
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tal flow
∑
a∈A f(a) and the single edge value mina∈A f(a). Then we showed
that the minimum flow distribution problem associated to the maximum
correlation linear graph attains those upper bounds. This showed that the
interdependencies in terms of interbank deposits must be larger for the max-
imum correlation linear graph than for any other market structure. We then
considered the spillover effect represented by the cost function C(a). We were
able to find an upper bound on its minimum value, and we could show that
the spillover effects associated to the maximum linear correlation graph are
at least as large as the upper bound on the minimum value. We could there-
fore conclude that if the cost-capacity condition is violated for all arcs in any
network, it is violated for all arcs in the network associated to the maximum
linear correlation graph.
The second result was derived with a similar approach. We derived lower
bounds for the minimum flow distribution problem associated to graphs with
nk/2 edges, and showed that the lower bounds were attained for the k-
regular bipartite graph. Then, by considering the cost-capacity condition for
the problem associated to a graph G, we showed that we can find a set of
parameters γ such that the condition is violated for a non-empty subset of
arcs in G if and only if G is not the k-regular bipartite graph.
7.2 Further research
This thesis takes a small step towards a better understanding of how the
market structure affects the robustness of the market within the framework
provided by Allen and Gale. Although we restricted our focus to robustness in
the Allen and Gale model for financial contagion, there are many interesting
aspects that have not been discussed and investigated in this thesis.
7.2.1 Robustness
The notion of robustness is an important discussion that has not been raised
in this thesis. An illustration is the robustness result we have derived for
the k-regular bipartite graph. We argue that it is the most robust graph
structure, and it certainly is by many measures, among others on average.
Yet we might find other graphs where certain nodes have a greater shock-
absorbing quality than nodes in the k-regular bipartite graph. The difference
between robustness towards random and targeted attacks have briefly been
mentioned in the thesis, but is one of the problems that one would need to
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address for more general robustness analysis. Another problem in defining
robustness is that for symmetric graphs, all regions will be bankrupt if the
spillover exceeds the buffer for at least one region, since the regions have
identical positions in the graph. For asymmetric graphs, the consequence of a
liquidity shock depends on the starting region and a crisis does not necessarily
spread to the whole economy. It is not obvious how these different effects
can be captured in a definition of robustness, and this discussion would be
important for further work.
7.2.2 Generalization of results
We have found an optimality result for graphs with nk/2 edges. A natural
next step would be to describe optimality conditions for any fixed number
of edges. There seem to be two key features that contribute strongly to the
robustness of a graph in the model
• Regularity (degree distribution)
• Low correlation between node types
Regularity and low correlation are conditions that together ensure that the
insurance that regions hold against uncertainty of future demand can as
spread out as possible, which in turn results in smaller interdependencies
between regions. Although this might be intuitively clear, and supported
by the results in this thesis, formalizing the intuition does not seem to be
straightforward, and this could be an interesting area of future work.
7.2.3 Real-world networks
In this thesis we consider mainly optimal and worst-case networks, none of
which we can expect to observe in the real world. Apart from the theoretical
interest in the networks analyzed, they may serve as benchmarks provid-
ing upper and lower bounds on robustness. To better understand complex
real-world networks, it would be interesting to describe robustness in terms of
network properties such as diameter, clustering, cohesiveness and correlation.
The program code written for this thesis, can be a starting point for simu-
lations to analyze these networks. By understanding robustness properties
of financial networks that we observe, policy makers, financial intermediaries
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and investors might be able to redesign the networks such that, in the fu-
ture, financial crises are less likely to occur and have smaller impact on the
global economy. Complex real-world networks are therefore one of the most
important directions to look into for further research in this field.
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AppendixA
Flow tables
Each flow table gives a vector w that solves the circulation problem. Since
w(a) = w(−a), we report the flow for the underlying edge, which includes
both a and −a. Redundant edges are included in these tables. Flow added
to redundant edges in simulations has not been included
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Flow in max.corr.lin.graph
Edge Flow
(1, 2) 0.1
(2, 3) 0.2
(3, 4) 0.3
(4, 5) 0.4
(5, 6) 0.5
(6, 7) 0.6
(7, 8) 0.7
(8, 9) 0.8
(9, 10) 0.9
(10, 11) 1
(11, 12) 0.9
(12, 13) 0.8
(13, 14) 0.7
(14, 15) 0.6
(15, 16) 0.5
(16, 17) 0.4
(17, 18) 0.3
(18, 19) 0.2
(19, 20) 0.1
Flow in min.corr.lin.graph
Edge Flow
(1, 2) 0.1
(2, 3) 0
(3, 4) 0.1
(4, 5) 0
(5, 6) 0.1
(6, 7) 0
(7, 8) 0.1
(8, 9) 0
(9, 10) 0.1
(10, 11) 0
(11, 12) 0.1
(12, 13) 0
(13, 14) 0.1
(14, 15) 0
(15, 16) 0.1
(16, 17) 0
(17, 18) 0.1
(18, 19) 0
(19, 20) 0.1
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Flow in star graph
Edge Flow
(1, 2) 0.1
(2, 3) 0.1
(3, 4) 0.1
(4, 5) 0.1
(5, 6) 0.1
(6, 7) 0.1
(7, 8) 0.1
(8, 9) 0.1
(9, 10) 0.1
(10, 11) 0.1
(11, 12) 0.1
(12, 13) 0.1
(13, 14) 0.1
(14, 15) 0.1
(15, 16) 0.1
(16, 17) 0.1
(17, 18) 0.1
(18, 19) 0.1
(19, 20) 0.1
Flow in random tree
Edge Flow
(1, 2) 0
(2, 3) 0.1
(3, 4) 0.3
(4, 5) 0.2
(5, 6) 0.1
(6, 7) 0.1
(7, 8) 0
(8, 9) 0.1
(9, 10) 0
(10, 11) 0.1
(11, 12) 0
(12, 13) 0.1
(6, 14) 0.1
(5, 15) 0.2
(15, 16) 0.1
(16, 17) 0
(17, 18) 0.1
(1, 19) 0.1
(3, 20) 0.1
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Flow in reg.bipart. graph
Edge Flow
(1, 2) 0.025
(2, 3) 0.025
(1, 4) 0.025
(3, 4) 0.025
(2, 5) 0.025
(4, 5) 0.025
(3, 6) 0.025
(5, 6) 0.025
(4, 7) 0.025
(6, 7) 0.025
(5, 8) 0.025
(7, 8) 0.025
(6, 9) 0.025
(8, 9) 0.025
(7, 10) 0.025
(9, 10) 0.025
(8, 11) 0.025
(10, 11) 0.025
(9, 12) 0.025
(11, 12) 0.025
(10, 13) 0.025
(12, 13) 0.025
(11, 14) 0.025
(13, 14) 0.025
(12, 15) 0.025
(14, 15) 0.025
(13, 16) 0.025
(15, 16) 0.025
(14, 17) 0.025
(16, 17) 0.025
(1, 18) 0.025
(15, 18) 0.025
(17, 18) 0.025
(2, 19) 0.025
(16, 19) 0.025
(18, 19) 0.025
(1, 20) 0.025
(3, 20) 0.025
(17, 20) 0.025
(19, 20) 0.025
Flow in min.corr.lattice
Edge Flow
(1, 2) 0.05
(1, 3) 0
(2, 3) 0.05
(2, 4) 0
(3, 4) 0.05
(3, 5) 0
(4, 5) 0.05
(4, 6) 0
(5, 6) 0.05
(5, 7) 0
(6, 7) 0.05
(6, 8) 0
(7, 8) 0.05
(7, 9) 0
(8, 9) 0.05
(8, 10) 0
(9, 10) 0.05
(9, 11) 0
(10, 11) 0.05
(10, 12) 0
(11, 12) 0.05
(11, 13) 0
(12, 13) 0.05
(12, 14) 0
(13, 14) 0.05
(13, 15) 0
(14, 15) 0.05
(14, 16) 0
(15, 16) 0.05
(15, 17) 0
(16, 17) 0.05
(16, 18) 0
(17, 18) 0.05
(1, 19) 0
(17, 19) 0
(18, 19) 0.05
(1, 20) 0.05
(2, 20) 0
(18, 20) 0
(19, 20) 0.05
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Flow in max.corr.lattice
Edge Flow
(1, 2) 0
(1, 3) 0.16
(2, 3) 0.018
(2, 4) 0.12
(3, 4) 0
(3, 5) 0.079
(4, 5) 0.011
(4, 6) 0.011
(5, 6) 0
(5, 7) 0.011
(6, 7) 0.011
(6, 8) 0.079
(7, 8) 0
(7, 9) 0.12
(8, 9) 0.018
(8, 10) 0.16
(9, 10) 0
(9, 11) 0.24
(10, 11) 0.021
(10, 12) 0.24
(11, 12) 0
(11, 13) 0.16
(12, 13) 0.018
(12, 14) 0.12
(13, 14) 0
(13, 15) 0.079
(14, 15) 0.011
(14, 16) 0.011
(15, 16) 0
(15, 17) 0.011
(16, 17) 0.011
(16, 18) 0.079
(17, 18) 0
(1, 19) 0.24
(17, 19) 0.12
(18, 19) 0.018
(1, 20) 0.021
(2, 20) 0.24
(18, 20) 0.16
(19, 20) 0
Flow in random graph
Edge Flow
(3, 7) 0
(5, 9) 0
(6, 9) 0.1
(1, 10) 0.1
(2, 10) 0
(4, 10) 0
(2, 11) 0.1
(4, 12) 0
(5, 14) 0.1
(6, 14) 0
(1, 15) 0
(4, 15) 0.1
(9, 15) 0
(10, 15) 0
(5, 16) 0
(11, 16) 0
(13, 16) 0.1
(3, 17) 0
(6, 17) 0
(11, 17) 0
(12, 17) 0.1
(14, 17) 0
(3, 18) 0
(4, 18) 0
(7, 18) 0.1
(8, 18) 0
(12, 18) 0
(13, 18) 0
(4, 19) 0
(6, 19) 0
(8, 19) 0.1
(10, 19) 0
(15, 19) 0
(3, 20) 0.1
(5, 20) 0
(6, 20) 0
(10, 20) 0
(12, 20) 0
(13, 20) 0
(15, 20) 0
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AppendixB
MATLAB Code
Except the Watts-Strogatz rewiring procedure and the conversion from ad-
jacency matrix to incidence matrix, all code has been written specifically for
this thesis. For graph drawing, I have used the package graphViz4Matlab,
but written a new method and also slightly modified other code segments
to make it to streamline it for our problem. The graphViz4Matlab-code is
not included in this appendix. The implementation of the Watts and Stro-
gatz rewiring procedure is taken from CONTEST toolbox by University of
Strathclyde1. Conversion from adjacency matrix to incidence matrix of a
graph uses code written by Ondrej Sluciak2.
1http://www.mathstat.strath.ac.uk
2http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral
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Program code B.1: Find properties of a given graph
f unc t i on [A v r l i s t ] = testRun ( graphtype , c o r r e l a t i o n , vararg in )
oh = 0 . 3 5 ;
o l = 0 . 1 5 ;
gamma = (oh+o l ) /2 ;
z = oh−gamma;
R=2;
[ x , y , c1 ]= f i r s t B e s t (R, oh , o l ) ;
[A v c l u s t betw d i s t c o r r e l ]= genGraph ( graphtype , c o r r e l a t i o n , vara rg in {1} ,
va ra rg in {2} , va ra rg in {3}) ;
A = A>0;
A = solveLP (A, v ) ;
A=A∗z ;
r l i s t = r l im (A, x , y , c1 , gamma,R) ;
minr=min ( r l i s t ) ;
b=bu f f e r (minr , x , gamma, c1 ,R) ;
mineps = (minr∗x−minr∗ c1/R∗(1−gamma) ) /( c1−c1∗minr/R) ;
maxr=max( r l i s t ) ;
drawGraph (A, v ) ;
c l = mean( c l u s t ) ;
diameter = max(max( d i s t ) ) ;
A = f u l l (A) ;
maxA = max(max(A) ) ;
minA = min (A(A>0.0001) ) ;
A = spar s e (A) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’ C lu s t e r i ng c o e f f i c i e n t i s : %d \n ’ , c l ) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’ Diameter i s : %d \n ’ , diameter ) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’ Co r r e l a t i on c o e f f i c i e n t i s : %d \n ’ , c o r r e l ) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’Minimum ep s i l o n to exceed the bu f f e r i s : %d \n ’ , mineps ) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’Maximum r to cause contag ion : %d \n ’ ,minr ) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’Maximum r to cause s p i l l o v e r to exceed bu f f e r in any node : %d \n
’ ,maxr ) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’ Bu f f e r s i z e i s : %d \n ’ ,b ) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’Max t r a n s f e r i s : %d \n ’ ,maxA) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’Min t r a n s f e r i s : %d \n ’ ,minA) ;
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Program code B.2: Optimal contract
f unc t i on [ x , y , c1 , c2 ] = f i r s t B e s t (R, oh , o l )
%So lve s the f i r s t −best optimal cont rac t g iven input R omegaH and omegaL
%The s o l u t i o n i s found d i r e c t l y from s e t t i n g the d e r i v a t i v e o f the problem
%to 0 .
gamma = (oh+o l ) /2 ;
konst = (1−gamma) /(gamma∗R) ;
c 1 d i f f = −konst ;
c2 = f z e r o (@(x ) ud(x , gamma,R, c 1d i f f , konst ) , 1) ;
x = (1−gamma) ∗ c2/R;
y = 1−x ;
c1 = y/gamma;
func t i on uder iv = ud(x , gamma,R, c 1d i f f , konst )
uder iv=c 1 d i f f ∗gamma/((1/gamma−konst ∗x ) ˆ2)+(1−gamma) /x ˆ2 ;
Program code B.3: Find optimal deposits
f unc t i on A = solveLP (A, v )
%Input : adjacency matrix A and a vec to r v . So lve s the min . f low d i s t r i b u t i o n
%problem
C = inc id enc e (A) ’ ;
l = length (C) ;
f = ones (1 , l ) ;
B = [C;−C; −eye ( l ) ] ;
k = v+((v==0)∗(−1) ) ;
z = ze ro s (1 , l ) ;
k = [ k −k z ] ;
%s o l v e s the LP problem
w = l i np r og ( f ,B, k ) ;
%Creates a weight matrix cor re spond ing to the adjacency matrix
[ i j ] = f i nd (A) ;
A = spar s e ( i , j ,w) ;
A = (A+A’ ) ;
%Add f low to redundant edges
%e r r = 0.00001
%f o r i =1: l ength (A)
% mini = min (A( i ,A( i , : )>e r r ) ) ;
% f o r j = 1 : l ength (A)
% i f (A( i , j )>0 && A( i , j )<e r r )
% A( i , j )=mini ;
% A( i , j )=0
% end
% end
%end
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Program code B.4: Find r-values
f unc t i on r l i s t= r l im (W, x , y , c1 , gamma,R)
%Function that c a l c u l a t e s the r va lue s that w i l l cause bankruptcy in bank j
%given an i n i t i a l bankruptcy in i . Returns a l i s t o f r va lue s that
cor responds to the
%edges in the graph .
m = sum(sum(W>0) ) ;
r l i s t = ze ro s (1 ,m) ;
n = length (W) ;
temp4 = ((1−gamma) ∗ c1 ) /R;
count=1;
f o r i =1:n
f o r j =1:n
wi j = W( i , j ) ;
i f ( wij>0)
sumwij = sum(W( i , : ) ) ;
t1 = wi j ∗ c1 ;
t2 = (y+sumwij∗ c1 ) /(1+sumwij ) ;
nom = t1−wi j ∗ t2 ;
t3 = (x∗wi j ) /(1+sumwij ) ;
denom = t3+x−temp4 ;
r l i s t ( count )=nom/denom ;
count = count +1;
end
end
end
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Program code B.5: Generate graph
f unc t i on [A v c l u s t betw d i s t c o r r e l ] = genGraph ( type , corr , n , vara rg in )
%Function that gene ra t e s d i f f e r e n t graph types . I t takes graph type ,
%c o r r e l a t i o n pattern , number o f nodes , average degree and r ew i r i ng
%p robab i l i t y as parameters . I t r e tu rn s the adjacency matrix o f the graph ,
%the vec to r v with node types , and c l u s t e r i n g c o e f f i c i e n t , betweenness ,
%d i s t ance and c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t o f the graph .
i f ( strcmp ( type , ’ l i n e ’ ) )
A = diag ( ones (n−1 ,1) ,1 ) ;
A = A+A’ ;
e l s e i f ( strcmp ( type , ’ s t a r ’ ) )
A = ze ro s (n) ;
A( 1 , : )=ones (1 , n ) ;
A = A’˜=A;
e l s e i f ( strcmp ( type , ’new ’ ) )
A = vararg in (2 ) ;
A=ce l l 2mat (A) ;
e l s e i f ( strcmp ( type , ’ b i p a r t i t e ’ ) )
k=vararg in {1} ;
A = b i p a r t i t e (n , k ) ;
e l s e i f ( strcmp ( type , ’ l a t t i c e ’ ) )
k = vararg in {1} ;
A = l a t t i c e (n , k ) ;
e l s e i f ( strcmp ( type , ’ r ew i r e ’ ) )
k = vararg in {1} ;
p = vararg in {2} ;
A = l a t t i c e (n , k ) ;
A = rew i r i ng (A, p) ;
end
i f ( strcmp ( corr , ’max ’ ) )
v = mod( 1 : n , 2 ) ;
e l s e i f ( strcmp ( corr , ’min ’ ) )
v = 1 : n<=n/2 ;
e l s e i f ( strcmp ( corr , ’ rand ’ ) )
v = randperm (n)>n/2 ;
end
A = spar s e (A) ;
A = +A;
c l u s t = c l u s t e r i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s (A) ;
betw = be tweenne s s c en t r a l i t y (A) ;
d i s t = a l l s h o r t e s t p a t h s (A) ;
c o r r e l = c o r r e l a t i o n (A, v ) ;
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Program code B.6: Effect of bankruptcy
f unc t i on l i s t = bfsGraph (A, n , cond1 , v , x , y , c1 , r ,R, z , gamma, draw )
i f ( draw )
[ g c o l o r s ]= drawGraph (A, v ) ;
end
i = [ ] ;
l i s t = ze ro s (1 , n ) ; %i n i t i a l i z e l i s t over bankrupt banks
s p i l l o v e r = ze ro s (1 , n ) ; %l i s t o f s p i l l o v e r e f f e c t s
i f ( cond1 )
b=bu f f e r ( r , x , gamma, c1 ,R) ;
f p r i n t f (1 , ’ Bu f f e r s i z e i s %f \n ’ ,b ) ;
l i s t (1 ) =1;
i ( 1 ) =1;
c o l o r s (1 )={ ’ r ’ } ;
i f ( draw )
pause ( ) ;
redrawDyn (g , c o l o r s ) ;
end
whi l e (˜ isempty ( i ) )
change = 0 ;
d = sum( f u l l (A( i (1 ) , : ) ) ) ; %degree o f bankrupt node
q i = f indq (x , y , c1 , z , r , d ) ; %s p i l l o v e r from bankrupt node
l=z ∗( c1−q i ) ;
f o r j =1:n
i f (A( i (1 ) , j )==1 && l i s t ( j )==0)
s p i l l o v e r (1 , j ) = s p i l l o v e r (1 , j )+l ;
cond2 = s p i l l o v e r (1 , j )>b ;
i f ( cond2 )
change = 1 ;
l i s t ( j )=1;
c o l o r s ( j )={ ’ r ’ } ;
i ( l ength ( i )+1)=j ;
end
end
end
i (1 ) = [ ] ;
i f ( change && draw )
pause ( ) ;
redrawDyn (g , c o l o r s ) ;
end
end
end
end
